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LEASING SOVEREIGNTY: ON STATE
INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS
Matthew Titolo *
I. INTRODUCTION:
INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATIZATION CONTRACTS
Infrastructure privatization is in the news.' In the past ten
years, Pennsylvania, California, Colorado, Indiana, and many
other states and municipalities have privatized--or attempted to
privatize-toll roads, parking meters and other public infrastruc-
ture. State and federal policies have encouraged these public-
* Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. J.D., University of
California, Berkeley; Ph.D, University of California, Los Angeles. I am grateful for the
feedback I received on this article by faculty at the Ohio Legal Scholarship Workshop, at
the Seventh Annual Conference on Contracts at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law, and
in faculty colloquia at West Virginia University College of Law. Brittany Vascik and Bill
Bogard provided excellent and timely editorial assistance. This article was completed with
the support of a West Virginia University Bloom Summer Research Grant.
1. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Willing to Lease Your Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2008, at C1 (reporting that large firms amassed an estimated $250 billion to finance infra-
structure privatization deals in the U.S. and abroad); Caitlin Devitt, Indianapolis Plan to
Lease City's Parking Meters Wins Approval, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 2010, at 28 (reporting
on an Indianapolis plan to lease parking meters to private company for fifty years); Mick
Dumke, Mayor Daley Pitches Chicago in Asia, But Who Js Buying? N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2010, at A29 (describing Mayor Daley's attempt to find foreign investors for Illinois infra-
structure projects); Darrell Preston, Morgan Stanley Group's $11 Billion Makes Chicago
Taxpayers Cry, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2010, 12:01 AM), http:/Iwww.bloomberg.com/news/20
10-08-09/morgan-stanley-group-s- 11-billion-from-chicago-meters-makes-taxpayers-cry.
html ("Chicago drivers will pay a Morgan Stanley-led partnership at least $11.6 billion to
park at city meters over the next seventy-five years, ten times what Mayor Richard Daley
got when he leased the system to investors in 2008."); Emily Thornton, Roads To Riches,
BUSINESSWEEK (May 6, 2007), http:/lwww.businessweek.com/stories/2007-05-O6/roads-to-
riches ("In the past year, banks and private investment firms have fallen in love with pub-
lic infrastructure. They're smitten by the rich cash flows that roads, bridges, airports,
parking garages, and shipping ports generate-and the monopolistic advantages that keep
those cash flows as steady as a beating heart.").
2. See Ellen Dannin, Crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastruc-
ture Privatization Contracts and Their Effects on State and Local Governance, 6 Nw. J.L.
& SOC. POL'Y 47, 48-50 (2011); Celeste Pagano, Proceed With Caution: Avoiding Hazards
in Toll Road Privatizations, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 351, 353 (2009) (discussing infrastruc-
ture privatization in Indiana, Illinois, Virginia, Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, Pennsylva-
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private partnerships and infrastructure privatizations.3 Private
development of public infrastructure was common in states and
municipalities during the nineteenth century.4 This was typically
done through granting corporate charters and franchises.5 Disen-
chantment with this model led to a public finance counterrevolu-
tion in the twentieth century.6 Privatization re-emerged in the
1980s and 1990s.7 Headlines such as "Why Does Abu Dhabi Own
All of Chicago's Parking Meters?" and "Cities for Sale" attest to
the continuing controversy surrounding these arrangements.8
nia and Texas); see also PHINEAS BAXANDALL, PRIVATE ROADS, PUBLIC COSTS: THE FACTS
ABOUT TOLL ROAD PRIVATIZATION AND HOW TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC 1-3 (2009), available
at http:/fcdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assetslH5QlONcoPVeVJwymwlURRwPrivate-Roa
ds-Public- Costs.pdf (providing a snapshot of infrastructure privatization proposals); FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN., STATE P3 LEGISLATION OVERVIEW TABLE, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd
/p3/statejlegislatiorstate-legislationoverview.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012) (surveying
public-private enabling legislation in thirty-three states).
3. For a discussion of the federal policies encouraging infrastructure privatization,
see BAXANDALL, supra note 2, at 13-15. See also Dominique Custos & John Reitz, Public-
Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. (SuPP.) 555, 557-58 & n.29 (2010) (discussing the
fragmented legal landscape of public-private partnerships).
4. Custos & Reitz, supra note 3, at 567 ("The nineteenth century saw substantial
state subsidization of private enterprises laying down the backbones of American utili-
ties.").
5. Id. at 568 ("Under franchise contracts passed with private corporations, their fi-
nancial aid came in six ways: cash payments, loan of credit, bond issuance, purchase of
shares in the corporation, tax-exemption and in the case of railroads, land grants.").
6. David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing:
An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1963) ('The wide-
spread disillusionment resulting from the excesses of the railroad bond era of the nine-
teenth century caused a constitutional revolution among the states. New limitations on
the financial powers of the states and their political subdivisions were adopted, including
express restrictions on government economic aid to private enterprises. At the same time,
the judiciary evolved a public purpose doctrine to complement the new constitutional pro-
visions.").
7. Custos & Reitz, supra note 3, at 562.
8. Max Fisher, Why Does Abu Dhabi Own All of Chicago's Parking Meters?, THE
ATLANTIC WIRE (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/201O/10/why-
does-abu-dhabi-own-all-of-chicago-s-parking-meters/18627/ (describing a potential loss of
control of Chicago's parking meters to foreign owners); Bethany McLean, Cities for Sale:
Psst! Wanna Buy the New Jersey Turnpike?, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2011, 6:30 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2011/03/cities for sale.html (discussing the lack of
transparency and conflicts of interest between banks advising cities regarding the feasibil-
ity of privatization and banks as profiting from those same deals); see also Yves Smith,
Durbin Bill Designed to Throw Wrench in Wall Street Infrastructure Heist, NAKED
CAPITALISM (June 18, 2011, 5:50 AM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2O11/06/durbin-
bill-designed-to-throw-wrench-in-wall-street-infrastructure-heist.html ("It is key to under-
stand what a bad deal these transactions are for ordinary citizens. In addition to having
sizeable upfront fees, the return requirements are well in excess of the government enti-
ties' borrowing rates, typically just under 20% .... On top of that, the deals also impose
serious restrictions on government sovereignty and often have extremely unfavorable
clauses that serve to guarantee the investors' returns.").
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Ellen Dannin has furnished one of the most extensive academic
critiques of infrastructure privatization contracts to date.9 The
typical agreement can run over a hundred pages, span the better
part of a century, and may include contract terms that make the
public the guarantor of the contractor's risk.10 Such provisions
curtail otherwise routine exercises of sovereign power in order to
protect the contractor's revenue stream." Dannin identifies three
clauses designed to reduce contractor risk by limiting the range of
government action. First, "compensation event" clauses require
the government to pay the contractor when certain triggering
events occur, such as an emergency road closure. 2 Second, non-
compete clauses prevent the government from building or repair-
ing competing infrastructure. 3 Third, adverse action clauses al-
low the contractor to retain the right to object to government de-
cisions that affect the profitability of the contract." Each of these
provisions requires the government to exchange some quantum of
sovereign power for up-front cash payments desperately needed
to cover short-term budget gaps-a need all the more acute in the
aftermath of the financial and real estate crises."
This article focuses on one of the more troubling features of in-
frastructure contracts: non-compete clauses. One such clause,
discussed below, forbade road improvements in Colorado that
would divert traffic away from the leased toll road.6 The Chicago
parking meter concession contract, to take another example, re-
quired the city to pledge that it would not build additional park-
ing meters within one mile of the concessionaire's leased meters. 7
The relevant legal principles include the Contract Clause, the re-
served powers doctrine, legal prohibitions on alienating sover-
9. See Dannin, supra note 2, at 82-92.
10. Id. at 54, 67.
11. See id. at 55.
12. Id. at 57.
13. Id. at 60-61.
14. Id. at 69-70.
15. 1d. at 51 ("States and cities are also using the up-front payments that are part of
many infrastructure privatization deals to address their budget deficits.").
16. Id. at 48 (citing Jeffrey Leib, Toll Firm Objects to Work on W. 160th: The "Non-
Compete" Clause for the Northwest Parkway Raises Legislative Concerns, DENY. POST, July
28, 2008, at B-04).
17. See CHICAGO PARKING METERS, LLC & CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO METERED
PARKING SYSTEM CONCESSION AGREEMENT § 3.12, at 47 (2008) [hereinafter CHICAGO
PARKING METER CONCESSION CONTRACT]. Selected sections of the concession agreement
are found infra at Appendix.
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eignty, and the inherent police powers of the state.8 I apply these
principles and conclude that the non-compete terms run afoul of
deeply rooted common law and constitutional principles. If my
analysis is correct, it follows that infrastructure contracts ought
to preclude terms that permit the alienation of sovereignty. To be
sure; what counts as an "alienation of sovereignty" will not al-
ways be obvious.' Governments, as a general rule, must honor
contract obligations.0 But this general statement of principle
solves very little and simply assumes away the legal and political
tensions that arise when the government enters the marketplace
as "private" contractor. This basic tension can be explained as fol-
lows. On the one hand, the government acts as sovereign trustee
of the public interest and enjoys a certain degree of trumping
power over private interests. On the other hand, when the gov-
ernment enters the market arena, it is cast as an equal counter-
party in a commercial contract.2' In this capacity, government will
resemble and is expected to behave as a reciprocally bound pri-
vate actor.2 But this resemblance is often illusory. Because the
government is not just another private party, advancing the
broader public interest-however difficult to define-is not pre-
cisely symmetrical with advancing aggregate private interests. In
other words, "efficiency" notwithstanding, the government cannot
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Ivan Kaplan, Note, Does the Privatization ofPublicly
Owned Infrastructure Implicate the Public Trust Doctrine? Illinois Central and the Chica-
go Parking Meter Concession Agreement, 7 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y. 136, 141 (2012) (propos-
ing reading the Chicago parking meter deal as an improper conveyance under the Illinois
Central public trust doctrine).
19. See Bruce D. Page, Jr., When Reliance Is Detrimental: Economic, Moral, and Poli-
cy Arguments for Expectation Damages in Contracts Terminated for the Convenience of the
Government, 61 A.F. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2008) (citing United State v. Winstar Corp., 518
U.S. 839, 894 (1996)) ('The distinction between government-as-contractor and govern-
ment-as-sovereign is ephemeral and cannot fairly be established by courts analyzing con-
tracts post hoc.").
20. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits
of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1146 (1996) ("If we allowed the
government to break its contractual promises without having to pay compensation, such a
policy would come at a high cost in terms of increased default premiums in future govern-
ment contracts and increased disenchantment with the government generally."); see also
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935) (quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S.
700, 718-19 (1878)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ('The United States are as much
bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as
much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the
repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citizen.").
21. See David B. Toscano, Forbearance Agreements: Invalid Contracts for the Surren-
der of Sovereignty, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 426 (1992).
22. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 876.
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auction off its power to govern.23 Longstanding legal norms limit
the scope, duration and subject matter of public-private contracts.
States contemplating public-private infrastructure deals should
think twice before selling the public birthright for a mess of pot-
tage.24
II. THE DEBATE OVER STATE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS
The 2007 Minneapolis bridge collapse focused public attention
on America's disintegrating infrastructure.5 Many states and
municipalities are betting on privatization to fill the gap left by
perennial budget shortfalls, state constitutional debt limits, and
the thorny politics of taxation. 26 These constraints on sound public
23. See id.
24. See Genesis 25:32-33.
25. Pagano, supra note 2, at 356 ('The disastrous Minneapolis bridge collapse on Au-
gust 1, 2007 brought to the nation's attention a problem that had been growing for some
time: Our nation's bridges and highways are quite literally crumbling.'); see also AM,
ASS'N OF ST. HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFICIALS, BRIDGING THE GAP: RESTORING AND
REBUILDING THE NATION'S BRIDGES 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.transportationl.
org/BridgeReport/docs/BridgingtheGap.pdf (discussing the Minneapolis bridge collapse);
BARRY B. LEPATNER, Too BIG TO FALL: AMERICA'S FAILING INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE WAY
HOME (2010) (arguing that the United States is in need of trillions of dollars worth of in-
frastructure repairs and maintenance); Nicholas J. Farber, Note, Avoiding the Pitfalls of
Public Private Partnerships: Issues To Be Aware of When Transferring Transportation As-
sets, 35 TRANSP. L.J. 25, 26 (2008) ("The tragic collapse of the 1-35W bridge in Minneapolis
brought a great deal of attention on our country's deteriorating transportation infrastruc-
ture and problems concerning its maintenance and repair."); Susan Saulny & Jennifer
Steinhauer, Bridge Collapse Revives Question About Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007,
at Al ("[The collapse] has focused national attention on the crumbling condition of Ameri-
ca's roadways and bridges-and on the financial and political neglect they have received in
Washington and many state capitals."); Eric Kelderman, The State of the Union-
Crumbling, PEW CENTER ON THE STATES (Jan. 16, 2008), http://www.pewstates.org/proj
ects/statelinelheadlines/the-state-of-the-union-crumbling-85899387455 ("More than one in
four of America's nearly 600,000 bridges need significant repairs or are burdened with
more traffic than they were designed to carry .... A third of the country's major roadways
are in substandard condition .... Dams, too, are at risk .... Underground, aging and in-
adequate sewer systems spill an estimated 1.26 trillion gallons of untreated sewage every
year, resulting in an estimated $50.6 billion in cleanup costs ... ").
26. See Julie A. Rain, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1965, 1978 (2011) (arguing that contemporary privatization arrangements have allowed
states to circumvent debt limits as a response to problems with public-private infrastruc-
ture provision); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 1241,
1255 (2009) ('Virtually every state constitution imposes limits on the amount of debt that
its political subdivisions can issue in order to fund capital projects ...."); Stewart E. Sterk
& Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of
Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1313 ('Today municipal debt lim-
itations are nearly as common a feature in state constitutions as are limitations on state
debt."); John Ziegler, The Dangers of Municipal Concession Contracts: A New Vehicle to
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finance may stymie even good faith attempts to rebuild the na-
tion's failing infrastructure. The financial crisis has, of course, on-
ly made things worse.27 Add to this a widespread ideological belief
among elites in the superiority of the market, and it is no sur-
prise that states and municipalities have turned to cash-rich pri-
vate equity investors for infusions of infrastructure capital.28
A. Criticisms Have Focused on Financial Value and Democratic
Accountability
Privatization has affected American governance at every level
but remains controversial.29 Infrastructure privatization critics
express several concerns. First, the claimed financial benefits of
infrastructure contracts are still disputed.9 For example, finan-
cial experts believe that the Chicago parking meter concession
contract was a bad deal for the city."' Parking rates quadrupled,
Improve Accountability and Transparency, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 571, 572-73 (2011) ("Re-
cently, depressed economies and falling tax revenues have resulted in budget shortfalls for
local governments. These shortfalls have threatened local governments' abilities to deliver
basic services to their citizens. Many local governments have opted to enter into conces-
sion contracts, a type of public private partnership (PPP), to obtain upfront cash infusions,
take advantage of private sector financing, and ensure the delivery of services.").
27. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., RECOVERY ACT: STATES' AND LOCALITIES'
USES OF FUNDS AND ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND
BOLSTER ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2010) ("[Mlany states and localities are still experiencing de-
clines in revenues due to the effects of the recession. The most recent simulations in our
state and local fiscal model show that the state and local government sector continues to
face growing long-term fiscal challenges over time, which have been exacerbated by the
current recession."); Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession's Impact, CENTER
ON BUDGET POLICIES & PRIORITIES (July 27, 2012), www.cbpp.org/cms/?index.cfm?fa-
view&id=711 ("'The Great Recession that started in 2007 caused the largest collapse in
state revenues on record.").
28. For a general discussion of market ideology in the context of privatization, see
generally Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 493
(2012).
29. Donald G Featherstun et al., State and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process,
30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 643, 644 (2001); see also Dannin, supra note 2, at 48; Titolo, supra note
28, at 494; Matt Stoller, Public Pays Price for Privatization, POLITICO (June 8, 2011, 9:29
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/56525.html ("Privatization takes inherent-
ly governmental functions-everything from national defense to mass transit and roads--
and turns them over to the control of private actors, whose goal is to extract maximum
revenue while costing as little as possible.").
30. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8; see also Roin, supra note 26, at 1969 ("Debt mas-
querading as privatization costs governments more than conventional debt ....
[G]overnments are unlikely to borrow at rates as favorable as the rates they would obtain
when issuing conventional debt.').
31. Dan Mihalopoulos, Company Piles Up Profits from City's Parking Meter Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A29 (reporting that parking meter rates quadrupled and that fi-
nancial experts believed that the city would have been better off financially if they simply
[Vol. 47:631
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and it was estimated that Chicago could have earned between
$670 million and $2 billion more if the city had kept the meters
public. 2 Second, there is the ever-present possibility of self-
dealing and corruption.33 The mechanics of the contracting pro-
cess raise red flags. On the contractor's side of the table sit savvy
repeat players with privatization experience, both domestically
and internationally. 4 On the government's side of the table, nego-
tiators may lack experience with large scale privatization pro-
jects. 5 Third, critics worry about the loss of public control, trans-
parency, and democratic accountability.6 As discussed below,
infrastructure contracts typically require the government to re-
linquish control over its prerogatives in order to insure the con-
tractor against possible losses. This problem is aggravated by the
fact that in order to secure favorable tax treatment, infrastruc-
ture contracts span many years.37 But these long-term contracts
pre-commit future legislatures to specific policy outcomes, thus
potentially creating unhealthy and undemocratic entrenchment.38
Finally, privatization can function as a form of covert taxation by
allowing states and municipalities to circumvent budget limita-
tions imposed by state constitutions, thus enabling politicians to
avoid the unpalatable option of raising taxes. 9 In my view, this
kept the meters).
32. Id.
33. See Dannin, supra note 2, at 77-82 (discussing the "infrastructure contractor
/investor/advisor revolving door.")
34. Id. at 77-78.
35. Id. at 75.
36. See id. (describing possible loss of accountability and public control where infra-
structure is privatized); see also Pagano, supra note 2, at 366-68 (discussing problems in-
herent in privatization including possible lack of democratic control of the process and
tension between public and private goals). See generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Privatiza-
tion of Public Water Services: The States'Role in Ensuring Public Accountability, 32 PEPP.
L. REV. 561 (2005) (describing public opposition to water privatization and advocating that
privatization be made accountable to the public).
37. Dannin, supra note 2, at 55 ("[S]horter contracts could mean losing the benefit of
federal tax provisions that allow contractors to take advantage of the ability to take highly
accelerated depreciation of the infrastructure. Those provisions are only available if the
contract term is so long it exceeds the useful life of the infrastructure and effectively
makes the private contractor the owner."); see also JEFFREY N. BUXBAUM & IRIS N. ORTIZ,
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE ROLE OF LONG-TERM CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
FOR PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 10 (2007), available at http://www.usc.
edulschools/price/keston/pdf120070618-trans-concession-agreements.pdf. ("The ability to
depreciate the 'value' of the asset for tax purposes seems to be one of the driving factors
behind the longer lease terms in the United States.").
38. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Private Law, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
879, 882 (2011).
39. See Roin, supra note 26, at 1986.
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can only forestall the long overdue debate about taxation for pub-
lic goods that Americans need to have.
B. Non-Compete Provisions Have Been Particularly Controversial
From the contractor's perspective, long-term infrastructure
deals are risky.0 For tax reasons, lease terms stretch out for dec-
ades.4' Needless to say, much can go awry in that time. For exam-
ple, if a company pays for the right to collect tolls on a road, the
financial value of that contract would be reduced-if not elimi-
nated altogether-were the government to build a light-rail sys-
tem that redirected the flow of commuters to the train.2 Fewer
drivers may be good policy, but it's bad for the contractor's bottom
line.43 Future policy shifts expose the company to serious financial
losses. As a result, contractors have insisted on "compensation
event" and non-compete clauses in infrastructure privatization
agreements.44 Typically, the government agrees not to build com-
peting public facilities.45 But there is a more pointed way of put-
ting this: the government must pay when it wishes to exercise its
sovereign prerogative to legislate for the public good in a way that
would deprive the contractor of revenue.46 For example, one toll
road contract in Commerce City, Colorado, required the govern-
ment "to lower speed limits and install unnecessary traffic lights
on a road parallel to the E-470 toll highway beginning in 2002.
The move was designed to make driving on Tower Road an un-
pleasant experience, forcing frustrated motorists to pay the toll to
get to their Denver-area destination. Such provisions are com-
40. See Dannin, supra note 2, at 55.
41. Id.
42. See infra Section IV.A (referencing Euphoria hypothetical).
43. See, e.g., infra Section IV.A (referencing Euphoria hypothetical).
44. See Dannin, supra note 2, at 57, 60 (explaining that "noncompete provisions are
commonly found in infrastructure privatization agreements, [but] they are not limited to
privatized roads"); Pagano, supra note 2, at 373 ("Another related potential source of con-
flict between a state and a toll road operator arises from the operator's desire to limit
competition with the toll road. A private company naturally wants to see a return on its
large up-front investment, and does not want to see its project underused due to competi-
tion from improved free roads. Therefore, concessionaires typically ask state transporta-
tion departments to agree not to widen or construct roadways within a certain distance of
the toll road.").
45. See, e.g., CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION CONTRACT, supra note 17.
46. See, e.g., id.
47. Colorado City Ruins Road to Boost Toll Revenue, THENEwSPAPER.COM (Aug. 15,
2005), http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/05/599.asp.
[Vol. 47:631
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mon in infrastructure contracts in the United States and abroad.4"
Another non-compete technique is "traffic calming," which chan-
nels traffic to the for-profit toll road by making traveling by al-
ternative routes slower and more expensive.4" Other times, as in
the controversial express toll lanes on California SR-91, the gov-
ernment must promise not to repair or otherwise maintain near-
by "competing" roads.5° In the case of the California SR-91 project,
this led to both public criticism and a lawsuit.5 '
It is not hard to see why these terms would raise the hue and
cry: the government is ceding a quantum of control over public
policy to for-profit companies. While volumes have been written
on privatization generally, there has not been much commentary
focusing on the legal status of infrastructure non-competes. 2 Sov-
ereignty and police powers have been alluded to in the recent lit-
erature,"3 but the general focus has been on the financial value of
the contracts and on questions of accountability. 4 Where scholars
do discuss the legal architecture of public-private arrangements,
they often focus on non-delegation, state action and agency prin-
ciples but not as much on the police powers concerns created by
infrastructure contracts."' I fill that lacuna by analyzing the legal
48. Dannin, supra note 2, at 61.
49. Id. It should be noted that traffic calming is not unique to non-compete contracts.
See Paul J. Ossenbruggen, The Impacts of Using a Safety Compliance Standard in High-
way Design, 10 RISK 359, 364 (1999).
50. Dannin, supra note 2, at 61.
51, Id.; see City of Corona v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., No. E032176, 2003 WL
22332968, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2003) ("[The Department of Transportation would
not add new public lanes to the highway without the agreement of the private toll road
operators."); Leib, supra note 16 (describing concerns expressed by Colorado lawmakers
regarding non-compete clauses in Northwest Parkway toll road contract).
52. See, e.g., Titolo, supra note 28.
53. See, e.g., infra note 121.
54. See, e.g., Dannin, supra note 2 at 51-53; see also Roin, supra note 26, at 1967-68.
55. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM, L. REV.
1367, 1367 (2003) (proposing constitutional analysis of privatization as delegation to pri-
vate parties under state action doctrine); see also Ellen Dannin, To Market, to Market: Leg-
islating on Privatization and Subcontracting, 60 MD. L. REV. 249, 258 (2001) (advocating
for a more comprehensive legal architecture for privatization to protect the public inter-
est); Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to Private
Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 509-12 (2011); Nick Beerman, Comment, Legal Mecha-
nisms of Public-Private Partnerships: Promoting Economic Development or Benefiting Cor-
porate Welfare? 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 179 (1999) ("[L]egal mechanisms used in pub-
lic-private partnerships ... skirt the constitution [and] violate the public trust.'); Ellen M.
Ehrhardt, Note, Caution Ahead: Changing Laws to Accommodate Public-Private Partner-
ships in Transportation, 42 VAL. U.L. REV. 905, 948 (2008) (discussing four important legal
issues in public-private enabling legislation) ("whether the enabling legislation allows un-
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status of non-competes under the Contracts Clause of the United
States Constitution and the related common law doctrine of inal-
ienable police powers. In the rush to privatize, governments have
not created an adequate legal architecture that protects the pub-
lic good. I have no ambitions to provide a comprehensive account
of infrastructure contracts here. Rather, my more modest aim is
to enrich the debate by analyzing one troubling aspect of recent
public contracts. The remainder of the article is therefore divided
in two parts. In the first section, I briefly discuss the history of
Contract Clause and police powers jurisprudence.56 I then analyze
a fictional non-compete clause in a hypothetical infrastructure
contract, which is a composite of some recent infrastructure
deals.57 I conclude that infrastructure non-compete clauses violate
police powers principles and that states should restrict the scope
of non-competes or eliminate them altogether.
III. CONTRACT VERSUS SOVEREIGNTY: THE INALIENABLE
POWERS PRINCIPLE
Since the Colonial era, governments at every level have con-
tracted for the provision of public goods and services. From the
nineteenth century onward, American corporations have built
and maintained roads and bridges; provided munitions and war
materials; and supplied municipalities with sanitation, electrici-
ty, and water services along with many other public goods.59 The
provision of public services is often mediated through contract.
60
Thus, it is fair to say that "public-private" partnerships are here
to stay.6' Nevertheless, government contracts have always embod-
solicited bids by contractors; whether prior legislative approval of projects is needed;
whether the public agency may hire its own consultants; whether the enabling legislation
will protect the confidentiality of PPP proposals and pre-contract negotiations").
56. James W. Ely Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 371,381 (2010).
57. While there is sample language from real-world infrastructure contracts included
in the Appendix, this article includes a hypothetical contract clause in Part IV, infra, for
the sake of simplicity.
58. See Chris Sagers, The Myth of "Privatization," 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 52-53 (2007)
("Instances of privatization in the United States are not only old, but have occurred in pro-
fusion for a long time. Elsewhere, private service of nominally public ends has occurred
extensively and for many centuries.").
59. See id.
60. See id. at 53 n.53 ("Americans regularly carry out an unusual range of important
social functions through nominally non.state associations.").
61. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,
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ied an irreducible tension between two core democratic and rule-
of-law principles. David Toscano neatly lays out the basic prob-
lem:
When the government enters into a contract with a person subject to
its laws, a tension immediately arises between that person's expecta-
tions and the government's need to tailor its actions to the demands
of sound public policy. Performing its obligations under a contract
requires the government to limit the exercise of some facet of its sov-
ereign power, from the ability to establish budget priorities freely to
the prerogative to regulate economic behavior. Thus, enforcing gov-
ernment contracts, especially those that purport to limit future exer-
cises of regulatory powers, is problematic in a democratic political
system.
The contract-sovereignty paradox intersects public and private
law and implicates two normative aspects of the state. On the one
hand, there is an enduring "private law" expectation that parties
to voluntary agreements will abide by their promised perfor-
mances.63 Contracting, after all, is a core institution of modern
commercial societies.64 The government is not exempted from
these promissory expectations. Governments, for example, rou-
tinely purchase goods from private companies without triggering
sovereignty concerns.66 On the other hand, the government-as-
667 (2000) ("In an era of contracting out, enforceable contracts form the connective tissue
between public and private actors; as such, they promise to be important vehicles of policy
making.").
62. Toscano, supra note 21, at 426; see also David S. Law, The Paradox of Omaipo-
tence: Courts, Constitutions, and Commitments, 40 GA. L. REV. 407, 413-15 (2006) (provid-
ing theoretical discussion of the paradox of a legislative power that is at the same time
both plenary and able to form self-binding commitments that limit its own plenary power).
63. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1 (1981) ("The promise principle... is
the moral basis of contract law, is that principle by which persons may impose on them-
selves obligations where none existed before.").
64. See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 100 (1936) ("[W]e may say that the movement of
the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract."); see also
John Chung, From Feudal Land Contracts to Financial Derivatives: The Treatment of Sta-
tus through Specific Relief, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN, L. 107, 150 (2009) (arguing that as
societies modernize, social relations that were once fixed under a status system become
'mutable through contract").
65. See Logue, supra note 20, at 1146; see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518
U.S. 839, 876 (1996) ("[I]t is clear that the National Government has some capacity to
make agreements binding future Congresses by creating vested rights .... "); Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-52, 354 (1934).
66. See, e.g., Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 880 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) ("At
one end of the wide spectrum are claims for enforcement of contractual obligations that
could not be recognized without effectively limiting sovereign authority, such as a claim
for rebate under an agreement for a tax exemption. Granting a rebate, like enjoining en-
forcement, would simply block the exercise of the taxing power and the unmistakability
doctrine would have to be satisfied. At the other end are contracts, say, to buy food for the
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sovereign has the "public law" obligation to legislate for the com-
mon good. 7 As the Supreme Court has said: 'Vithout regard to
its source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an endur-
ing presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's
jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmis-
takable terms. ,68 This in turn means that a government must re-
tain some degree of freedom to abrogate agreements or risk losing
its "enduring presence." Thus, government contracts "remain sub-
ject to subsequent legislation" by the sovereign. 9 These principles
cash out in practice as the following internally inconsistent prop-
osition: governments must retain the unilateral power to break
the very same promises we require them to honor. Courts have
been puzzling over the sovereignty-contract dilemma since the
nineteenth century. This longstanding tension has never been-
and can never be-fully resolved under a hybrid system of public-
private governance. Nevertheless, we must build some legal
framework to protect the public interest and resolve the inevita-
ble disputes that will arise in the coming years. Sections III.A
through C explain the doctrinal framework for analyzing the con-
tract-sovereignty tension as it plays out in the non-compete
clauses.
army; no sovereign power is limited by the Government's promise to purchase and a claim
for damages implies no such limitation. That is why no one would seriously contend that
enforcement of humdrum supply contracts might be subject to the unmistakability doc-
trine. Between these extremes lies an enormous variety of contracts including those under
which performance will require exercise (or not) of a power peculiar to the Government.").
67. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) (quot-
ing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("[T]he Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States ....
This power . . is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives,
health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights
under contract between individuals.").
68. Merrion v. Jicarilla, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982); see also Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Op-
posed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148)
("[W]e have declined in the context of commercial contracts to find that a sovereign forever
waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the
right to exercise that power in the contract.").
69. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147; see also Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485,
491 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("The Government cannot make a binding contract that it will not exer-
cise a sovereign power, but it can agree in a contract that if it does so, it will pay the other
contracting party the amount by which its costs are increased by the Government's sover-
eign act.").
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A. Early Cases Enforce the Contract Clause and Reveal the
Perennial Tension Between Sovereignty and Contract
The Contract Clause provides that "no State shall ... pass
any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts"7 and supplies
the baseline for analyzing the power of state governments to im-
pair public and private agreements. 7 There are several important
principles to highlight here. First, the Contract Clause applies on-
ly to state and local governments and not to the federal govern-
ment.72 Second, the original purpose of the Contract Clause was to
prevent state governments from canceling debtor obligations in
times of crisis." Third, legislative promises to private parties are
70. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
71. See Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundation of Government Land Use Deals,
65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 962 (1987) ("Over two centuries the Contract Clause has comprised a
key arena in which tensions between contract obligations and police power needs have
been explored, debated, and resolved in many different contexts."). See generally
BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938).
Other relevant doctrines include property concepts such as takings and the public trust
doctrine. See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract
Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and 'Takings" Clause Jurisprudence,
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 41-43 (1986); see also Michael L. Zigler, Note, Takings Law and the
Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (1984).
72. It is easier for the federal government to back out of contracts. It has been settled
since the nineteenth century that Congress can expressly reserve the right to "repeal, alter
or amend" contracts with private parties at any time. See, e.g., Bowen, 477 U.S. at 53
(quoting Nat'l R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
456 (1985)) (Congress can expressly reserve the right to "repeal, alter, or amend [legisla-
tion] at any time."). Moreover, the federal government can reserve the right to terminate a
contract for convenience. See Green Mgmt. Corp. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 411, 436
(1998) ("The government, as a matter of procurement policy, possesses the authority to
terminate a contract for the convenience of the government, even in circumstances when a
convenience termination clause has been omitted from the contract."). As explained in Sec-
tion III.C, infra, Winstar has complicated this principle.
73. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502-03 (1987)
("[1]t is well settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not
to be read literally. [The history of the Contract Clause] indicate[s] that its primary focus
was upon legislation that was designed to repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor
relationships that obligors were unable to satisfy."); Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 256 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1933)) ("[The Contract
Clause] was made part of the Constitution to remedy a particular social evil-the state
legislative practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their obligations under certain
contracts-and thus was intended to prohibit States from adopting 'as [their] policy the
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of the means to enforce
them."'); Michael B. Rappaport, Note, A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93
YALE L.J. 918, 932 (1984).
20131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"contracts" within the meaning of the Contract Clause. 4 Fourth,
despite the apparently clear and categorical language of Article I,
Section 10, Clause 1, courts have not parsed the Contract Clause
"with literal exactness."7 Finally, scholars describe a public and a
private branch of Contract Clause jurisprudence.76 This distinc-
tion turns on whether the impaired contract is between two pri-
vate parties or between a private party and the state.77 Because
this article is concerned with state infrastructure contracts, it will
focus on the public branch of the Contract Clause. The doctrinal
story is one of "robust enforcement" in the early to mid-
nineteenth century, a slow decline to near nullity in the New Deal
period, and a minor revival in the late 1970s. 5
1. Early Cases
The Marshall Court established expansive Contract Clause
protection.79 Fletcher v. Peck" is the most famous of these early
cases. In Fletcher, the Georgia state legislature had granted land
to several companies in 1795."' In 1796, the legislature found that
the 1795 grant of land had been procured via undue influence and
as a result nullified it. 2 In 1803, Peck sold to Fletcher land that
was part of the original 1795 grant 3 Peck covenanted that his ti-
tle to the land had not been impaired by the legislature's 1796 re-
scission of the original grant.8 4 Fletcher in turn accused Peck of
breaching this covenant because, among other things, the 1795
74. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977) ('[A] statute is
itself treated as a contract when the language and circumstances evince a legislative in-
tent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State.").
75. Id. at 21 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 U.S. at 428) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
76. Ely, supra note 56, at 381.
77. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO, L.J. 1593, 1604 (1988) ("Distinct 'private' and 'public' branches of contract clause
jurisprudence had emerged, each having little to do with the other. The private branch
governed state impairment of previously negotiated contracts between individuals. The
public branch governed legislative impairment of state corporate grants and, to a lesser
extent, public land grants when the state itself was a party to the bargain for which pro-
tection was sought.").
78. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 56, at 381-82, 391-92 & n.139.
79. Id. at 374.
80. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
81. See id. at 88.
82. Id. at 89-90.
83. Id. at 87.
84. Id. at 88.
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legislature lacked the authority to convey the land and the 1796
legislature had in any event rescinded the grant.8" The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding that whatever the corrupt
motives of the 1795 legislature in conveying the land, once con-
veyed, the legislature could not rescind the grant.6 Retroactivity
concerns to protect vested rights were at the heart of the Court's
decision.87 The Chief Justice stated flatly that "if an act be done
under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it." s8 Once
granted, the rights have vested. 9
The Court reaffirmed the vitality of the Contract Clause nine
years later in the landmark case Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward. ° King George had chartered Dartmouth College in
1769."' The original charter had granted the trustees the power to
hire and remove teachers, to set salaries, and to be the sole gov-
erning body of the college. 2 In 1816, New Hampshire amended
the charter by changing the number of trustees, granting the
state the power to make appointments, creating a board of over-
seers, and otherwise altering the basic governing structure of the
college." These alterations would effectively revoke the 1769
charter.94 In a lengthy opinion, Justice Marshall reasoned that
just as New Hampshire lacked the power to interfere with the
original charter grant in 1769, the state was powerless to do so
85. See id. at 126, 135.
86. See id. at 130.
87. Id. at 138-39. Retroactivity concerns continue to animate Contract Clause juris-
prudence. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Iowa 1988)
(striking down legislation under the Contract Clause because it retroactively extended the
period in which parties could redeem homesteads from foreclosure); see also Allied Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978) (holding that the Contracts Clause
prohibited retroactive alteration of employee vesting under pension plan); U.S. Trust Co.
of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977) (holding that the Contract Clause prohib-
ited "the retroactive repeal of the 1962 covenant"). For a recent discussion of the retroac-
tivity principle, see generally Matthew Titolo, Retroactivity and the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009, 86 IND. L.J. 257, 269-80 (2011) (discussing the landmark retro-
activity decision Landgraf v. USI Film Products and its progeny) and Ann Woolhandler,
Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015 (2006) (pro-
posing that the categories of public and private can organize and structure retroactivity
jurisprudence).
88. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
89. Id.
90. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 518 (1819).
91. Id. at 519.
92. Id. at 526-27.
93. Id. at 539-41.
94. See id. at 554.
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years later." After all, if the legislature had effectively revoked
the charter grant in 1769, "the perfidy of the transaction would
have been universally acknowledged.""6 The original 1769 grant
was a contract like any other and, as such, deserved the protec-
tion afforded by the Contract Clause. 7 By completely changing
the governing structure of the college, the New Hampshire legis-
lature had impaired the original contract.98
Despite the clear holdings in the earlier decisions, their reason-
ing reveals the unsolved contract-sovereignty puzzle that remains
at the heart of Contract Clause jurisprudence." Fletcher v. Peck
provides the template. In the passage quoted above, Chief Justice
Marshall declares that a legislature may not undo its earlier
acts.' 9 However, a contrary statement in the same case reveals a
crack in Fletcher's Contract Clause architecture: "The principle
asserted is, that one legislature is competent to repeal any act
which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one
legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.
The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legis-
lation, can never be controverted.""1 So, on the one hand, vested
rights logic tells us that a legislative grant of contract rights can-
not be undone ("[Olne legislature cannot abridge the powers of a
succeeding legislature."). On the other hand, a later legislature
can repeal a prior grant under the guise of general legislation
("[O]ne legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former
legislature was competent to pass."). Here we have an unresolved
conflict of elemental principles, which Justice Johnson addresses
in his concurring opinion. He agrees that the state cannot revoke
95. See id. at 643.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 644 ('It is a contract made on a valuable consideration. It is a contract
for the security and disposition of property. It is a contract, on the faith of which, real and
personal estate has been conveyed to the corporation. It is, then, a contract within the let-
ter of the constitution .... ").
98. See id at 652-53 ("The founders of the college contracted, not merely for the per-
petual application of the funds which they gave, to the objects for which those funds were
given; they contracted also, to secure that application by the constitution of the corpora-
tion. They contracted for a system, which should, so far as human foresight can provide,
retain forever the government of the literary institution they had formed, in the hands of
persons approved by themselves. This system is totally changed.").
99. For an extended discussion of the local government cases dealing with this issue,
see generally Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the Govern-
mental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1990).
100. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
101. Id.
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its grants, but he sees a deeper and more fundamental problem
lurking in the Court's reasoning.102 It is an ontological feature of
sovereignty-that is, an aspect of the very essence of the con-
cept-that sovereignty cannot negate itself.0 3 It would be absurd-
ly self-cancelling for the government to create an irrevocable
vested interest only to negate the same sovereign act that created
that interest"'4 Moreover, as Justice Johnson suggests, it cannot
be the case that the tension between public power and private
rights must always be resolved in favor of private rights.0 To set
up the rule that way would be to waive the power of eminent do-
main, a core aspect of sovereignty.'6
2. Police Powers Jurisprudence and the Decline of the Contract
Clause in the Late Nineteenth Century
Enforcement of the Contract Clause was uneven through the
mid-nineteenth century. 7 However, by the 1840s, the balance be-
102. Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
103. This "self-negating sovereign" paradox has been thoroughly dissected in the aca-
demic literature. See, e.g., Law, supra note 62, at 409, 415-16.
104. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 144-45.
106. Some early courts relied on the rights/remedies distinction in an attempt to recon-
cile the contract-sovereignty problem. See, e,g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819) (noting that the legislature could not retroactively nullify a credi-
tor's right to sue in bankruptcy but could retroactively alter the remedy available to the
creditor); see also Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370, 378 (1827) (retroactively limit-
ing punishment of bankruptcy did not impinge on creditor rights under the Contract
Clause); Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio 274, 276-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) ("In the nature of
things, there is a distinction between the change of a contract and a change of the remedy
to enforce the performance of the contract. Under the Constitution of the United States,
the former power is denied to the several States, but the latter exists in full force."). The
Supreme Court in United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, explains that the
rights/remedies distinction cannot provide a bright-line to determine whether the impair-
ment is permissible. 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977). However, it might be used as one factor to
determine how severe the impairment is based on the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties: "More recent decisions have not relied on the remedy/obligation distinction, primarily
because it is now recognized that obligations as well as remedies may be modified without
necessarily violating the Contract Clause." Id. (citing El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497,
506-07, 506, n.9 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-35)
(1934)). "Although now largely an outdated formalism, the remedy/obligation distinction
may be viewed as approximating the result of a more particularized inquiry into the legit-
imate expectations of the contracting parties." Id. at 20.
107. Courts adopted varieties of Contract Clause analysis. Sometimes courts enforced
the Contract Clause, but with qualifications. See, e.g., Boston & Lowell R.R. Corp. v. Sa-
lem & Lowell R.R. Co., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 1, 31 (1854) (citing Fletcher's vested rights rea-
soning to hold that an exclusive thirty-year railroad franchise cannot effectively be nulli-
fied by a later grant that impairs the exclusive franchise); see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25
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tween contract and sovereignty began to tip more decisively in fa-
vor of the latter. The paradox that haunted the earlier cases be-
came impossible to ignore by midcentury."'0 West River Bridge Co.
v. Dix' marks the turning point. In 1795, the State of Vermont
granted the West River Bridge Corporation a one hundred-year
charter to build and maintain a toll bridge.10 By the early 1840s,
the toll bridge had become "a sore grievance," and members of the
local community petitioned the county court to remove it. 11 The
West River Corporation invoked the Contract Clause to defend its
monopoly from legislative abrogation.112 The Supreme Court re-
jected the company's Contract Clause argument. 13 Justice Daniel
wrote:
No State, it is declared, shall pass a law impairing the obligation of
contracts; yet, with this concession constantly yielded, it cannot be
justly disputed, that in every political sovereign community there
inheres necessarily the right and the duty of guarding its own exist-
ence, and of protecting and promoting the interests and welfare of
the community at large. 14
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (holding that the Contract Clause bars retroactive interfer-
ence with contract but does not bar legislature from future-oriented regulations impairing
contract obligations); Wash. Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53, 64-65 (1846) (holding that
unless the state explicitly reserved the right to invalidate earlier grants, the Contract
Clause prevented it from doing so). Other courts articulated a police powers rationale for
upholding legislative interference with earlier contracts. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (citing both the principle that public grants
should be strictly construed and the intrinsic logic of sovereignty to reject a Contract
Clause claim that an earlier franchise granted exclusive rights for a company to run a fer-
ry service); see also Mohawk Bridge Co. v, Utica & Schenectady R.R. Co., 6 Paige Ch. 554,
554 (N.Y. Ch. 1837) ('The grant to a corporation of the right to erect a toll bridge across a
river, without any restriction as to the right of the legislature to grant a similar privilege
to others, does not deprive a future legislature of the power to authorize the erection of
another toll bridge across the same river ....). Where police power trumped contract,
courts sometimes required "takings" compensation. See, e.g., Shorter v. Smith, 9 Ga. 517,
529 (1851) (holding that the legislature could interfere with prior grant where public poli-
cy required it as long as compensation was paid); State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, 208 (1859)
(state grant could not be construed as limiting legislative exercise of sovereignty unless
the legislature intended to do this and provided just compensation.); Backus v. Lebanon,
11 N.H. 19, 22 (1840) (allowing state to exercise eminent domain where it had earlier
granted a corporation the right to collect tolls on roadway as long as the state paid just
compensation). However, as a rule, if a government act is classified as a police power, no
compensation is required. See infra Section IV.B.3.
108. See Griffith, supra note 99, at 290.
109. See 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
110. Id. at 507.
111. Id. at 508-09.
112. See id. at 511-12.
113. Id. at 512.
114. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
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Thus the West Bridge Court answered Justice Johnson's concern
in Fletcher that the Contract Clause read literally negates the in-
herent power of sovereign government.15 Note that Justice Daniel
expresses the rule here as an existential one: the sovereign-qua-
sovereign must retain trumping power over countervailing inter-
ests if the sovereign is to survive and promote the "welfare of the
community at large.""' In other words, as discussed below, the
government must retain its police power.
This more expansive view of sovereignty had historical and ju-
risprudential sources. Historically, the late nineteenth century
marked the emergence of the American regulatory state. 7 With
the emergence of the regulatory state, public power inevitably col-
lided with earlier grants of exclusive corporate franchises through
which public functions were mediated."8 At the same time, legal
critics began to view the Contract Clause as a vehicle to entrench
corporate power."' Scholars and courts invoked the ancient "po-
lice power" principle to resolve these discrepancies between pri-
vate rights and public power."' As Thomas M. Cooley explained
in his influential 1868 treatise:
The police of a State ... embraces its system of internal regulation,
by which it is sought not only to preserve the public order and to
prevent offences against the State, but also to establish for the inter-
course of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and
115. See id. at 532; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143-45 (1810) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
116. See W. River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531.
117. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1189 (1986) (noting that the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in 1887 signified that "[t]he modern age of administrative government had be-
gun"); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 329 (3d ed. 2005)
(noting that the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission marked the "starting
point" of the American regulatory state). But see, Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administra-
tive Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1365-66 (2010) ("[T]he United States was
an administrative government from the very beginning of the Republic."). There is an on-
going debate among historians of the regulatory state regarding the proper chronology
that is well reviewed in William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American Capi-
talism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377, 379-85 (2010) (reviewing four distinct views of the emergence
and development of the American regulatory state: (1) "laissez faire constitutionalism;" (2)
"the capture thesis;" (3) 'The Weakened Spring of [American] government;" and (4) "ad-
versarial economic regulation").
118. See Ely, supra note 56, at 381.
119. Id. ("By the dawn of the Gilded Age, prominent scholars and jurists were increas-
ingly skeptical of what they saw as special corporate privileges secured by the Contract
Clause.").
120. See id.
20131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is• . 121
reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others .
A series of cases enshrined the principle that legislative at-
tempts to bargain away police powers are effectively void ab ini-
tio.122 Notice that this is different from the "entrenchment" con-
cern that earlier lawmakers not restrain the power of a
subsequent legislature to legislate for the public welfare. ' Alt-
hough the police power principle was first mentioned by the
Court in the 1824 case Gibbons v. Ogden"4 and was discussed in
121. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 572 (3d ed. 1874).
The literature on police power is extensive. This article does not pretend to provide com-
prehensive coverage of the concept. For an excellent recent scholarly treatment, see
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3 (2005) (providing an account of the police power that empha-
sizes its connection to the plenary powers of patriarchal household governance). See also
David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History
Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 502-05 (2004) (furnishing history of the
police power from ancient origins that focuses on the power to police public space embod-
ied in the phrase sic utera tuo alienum non laedas). See generally D. Benjamin Barros, The
Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471 (2004); Griffith, supra note
99; Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
745 (2007).
122. See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 192 P. 349, 356 (Okla. 1920) ("As neither
the state nor the municipality can surrender by contract the [police] power..., a contract
purporting to do so is void ab initio, and, being void, it is impossible to speak of laws in
conflict with its terms as impairing the obligations of a contract."); see also Butchers' Un-
ion Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750-51 (1884) ("While we are not prepared to say that
the legislature can make valid contracts on no subject embraced in the largest definition of
the police power, we think that, in regard to two subjects so embraced, it cannot, by any
contract, limit the exercise of those powers to the prejudice of the general welfare."); Rob-
ert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: IL, 57 HARV. L. REV. 621, 654
(1994) ("A state cannot surrender certain exercises of its police power by contract.").
123. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 122, at 657, 659 (noting that the holding in Stone v.
Mississippi was based on an absolute prohibition on alienating sovereignty, not on the leg-
islature's power to bind future legislatures). Hale takes a somewhat different approach to
the "void ab initio" issue. He seems to think that a contract that barters away the police
power (what this article calls "void ab initio") could be adjudicated a valid contract under
state late but still be held unconstitutional. Id. at 659. It would be better to view contracts
that barter away the police power as failing because the legislature lacked the capacity to
enter an illegal contract in the first place: the initial incapacity approach.
124. 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 19 (1824). The Court first used the term police powers as ex-
plicitly referring to the reserved powers of the states in Brown u. Maryland. 25 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 419, 443, 453 (1827) (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195, 208) ("'The completely in-
ternal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself ...
'[T]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to gov-
ern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this subject (commerce) to a considerable
extent."'); see also David A. Thomas, Whither the Public Forum Doctrine: Has This Crea-
ture of the Courts Outlived its Usefulness?, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 637, 653 (2010)
(noting that the Court first used the term police power to refer to the "residual sovereign
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several other early Supreme Court cases, 2 5 the police power prin-
ciple became prominent in a series of decisions beginning in the
1870s. Boyd v. Alabama2 was the first of these decisions. The
Boyd defendant was indicted in Alabama for running a lottery
without state authorization but claimed that he had been granted
a continuing license to run the lottery under an 1868 act, which
had later been repealed.' 7 The Supreme Court rejected this de-
fense based on an Alabama high court decision finding the 1868
legislation violated the state constitution's single subject matter
provision. '1 8 In doing so, the Boyd Court took the opportunity to
make this succinct observation: "We are not prepared to admit
that it is competent for one legislature, by any contract with an
individual, to restrain the power of a subsequent legislature to
legislate for the public welfare, and to that end to suppress any
and all practices tending to corrupt the public morals."'2 9
After Boyd, courts reinforced this expansive reading of the po-
lice power and consequently narrowed the scope of the Contract
Clause.' The claimant in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, for example,
had been granted an 1828 state charter "for the purpose of manu-
facturing malt liquors in all their varieties."'3 ' An 1869 liquor
prohibition law effectively nullified this earlier grant.' 32 Citing
Boyd, the Court stated that although the boundaries of the police
power concept were not clear, "there seems to be no doubt that it
does extend to the protection of the lives, health, and property of
the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public
morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the
power to provide for these objects."'32 Another lottery case, Stone v.
Mississippi, clarified the emerging consensus view that even
where an earlier legislature had granted in clear terms an exclu-
sive right via contract, these rights are not enforceable against a
power of the American states" in Brown u. Maryland).
125. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 128, 142, 148 (1837).
126. 94 U.S. 645 (1876).
127. Id. at 647.
128. Id. at 648-49.
129. Id. at 650.
130. WRIGHT, supra note 71, at 91 (noting that the decline of the Contract Clause be-
gan in the 1860s).
131. 97 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1877).
132. See id. at 29.
133. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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later exercise of sovereign power.'34 This is because "the legisla-
ture cannot bargain away the police power of a State.""13 Any leg-
islative act that purports to bind the sovereign power of future
legislatures via contract-however clear the terms-is effectively
ultra vires rendering the earlier purported grant void ab initio1
36
On this reading, no compensation would be required because, by
hypothesis, nothing has been taken. Since the nineteenth centu-
ry, it has been clear that a legislature is powerless to contract
away essential attributes of sovereignty. 137
134. 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1880).
135. Id. at 817; see Ely, supra note 56, at 383 (noting that there was an exception in
this period to grants of favorable tax treatment and attributing this "anomalous" case to "a
respect for precedent"); see also Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 499 (1894)
(treating as well settled the power of Tennessee to grant a tax exemption conferring "ei-
ther total or partial immunity from taxation, and extend[ed] for any length of time the leg-
islature might deem proper"); Wash. Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 439, 441 (1869)
(holding that a corporation could continue to assert its contractual right to favorable tax
treatment as long as it stayed within the bounds of its original charter); Home of the
Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 430, 436, 438 (1869) (providing that legislative grant
of favorable tax treatment to charity could not be revoked).
136. See Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 670 (1878) ("[W]e cannot regard [the
license] as a contract guaranteeing, in the locality originally selected, exemption for fifty
years from the exercise of the police power of the State, however serious the nuisance
might become in the future, by reason of the growth of population around it."). In dissent,
Justice Strong objected that such a broad reading of the police power "enables a subse-
quent legislature to take away, without compensation, rights which a former one has ac-
corded, in the most positive terms, and for which a valuable consideration has been paid."
Id. at 682 (Strong, J., dissenting). Of course, on the void ab initio reading, no compensa-
tion would be required precisely because the earlier "grant" was ineffective and hence cre-
ated no rights in the first place. For the void ab initio framing, see, for example, Butchers'
Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750-51 (1884) (holding that the legislature not permit-
ted to bargain away the power to regulate public health and public morals), and see also
State ex rel. Townsend v. Board of Park Commissioners, 110 N.W. 1121, 1122-23 (Minn.
1907) (stating that a contract promising that the state would maintain a parkway free of
cost to adjacent landowners was "an attempted alienation of the police power and void").
Even where courts did not explicitly invoke the void ab initio language, they gave wide
latitude for the legislative exercise of police powers. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199
U.S. 473, 480 (1905) ("It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes
impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such pow-
ers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the gen-
eral good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected.").
137. See, e.g., Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 501 (1919); Atl. Coast Line
R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914) ("[i]t is settled that neither the 'contract'
clause nor the 'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to
establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good
order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdi-
cated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract
and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise."); see also Douglas v. Kentucky,
168 U.S. 488, 505 (1897) (noting that bargaining away the police power would be "destruc-
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3. There are Two Distinct "Police Power" Issues in Contract
Clause Analysis
The principle that the government may not contract away sov-
ereignty is also referred to as the "inalienable powers" or "re-
served powers" principle.138 It is a close relation to the "public
trust" doctrine, which forbids the state from abdicating control
over navigable waterways.' Some scholars have argued that this
principle is an artifact of history that serves little practical pur-
pose. 40 American courts, however, do not take this view.'4' The
core concern of inalienable powers is to prevent the government
from delegating too much public authority to private parties.' In
its broadest articulation, police power can simply be described as
the inherent power of the legislature to protect public health,
safety, and morals. 14  State constitutions often include clauses
that grant the police power to the state and impose an obligation
on state officials to guard the police power against encroach-
ments.' The police power is distinguished from eminent domain
tive of the main pillars of government").
138. See Griffith, supra note 99, at 281-83, 291.
139. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892) ("[Ajbdication of the
general control of the State over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or
bay, or of a sea or lake ... is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires
the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public. The trust
devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged by the man-
agement and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relin-
quished by a transfer of the property."); see also Kaplan, supra note 18, at 160 (arguing
that the Chicago parking meter contract violates the public trust doctrine).
140. See, e.g., Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: Winstar and the Need to
Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 KY. L.J. 245, 264 (2000) ('The re-
served powers doctrine is essentially an artifact of legal history.").
141. See, e.g., ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 445-54.
142. Bald Head Island Utils. Inc. v. Vill. of Bald Head Island, 599 S.E.2d 98, 100 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing Rockingham Square Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Madison, 262
S.E.2d 705, 707-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)) ("Limitations on these governmental body con-
tractual powers exist to prevent too much authority being delegated away to parties that
may not represent the people's best interests.").
143. See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. at 746-54 (1884) (Field, J., concur-
ring); see also Cheyene Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985) ("The legiti-
mate objectives of the police power are loosely characterized as being public in nature and
the potential range is very broad.").
144. See, e.g., W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 2. ('The government of the United States is a gov-
ernment of enumerated powers, and all powers not delegated to it, nor inhibited to the
states, are reserved to the states or to the people thereof. Among the powers so reserved to
the states is the exclusive regulation of their own internal government and police; and it is
the high and solemn duty of the several departments of government, created by this Con-
stitution, to guard and protect the people of this State from all encroachments upon the
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in that if classified as eminent domain, government action re-
quires compensation where if the action is classified as a police
power, it does not. 145 Some representative examples from the cas-
es include the power to regulate the consumption of alcohol,'4 6 to
prevent crime,'47 to control the public streets, 4 ' to regulate public
nuisances,' to prohibit noxious chemicals,' and generally to de-
cide matters of public policy and regulate in the public good."'
However, enshrining special tax treatment via contract does not
trigger police power concerns.' 2 The government cannot simply
invoke the police power to escape ordinary financial commit-
ments. '53
rights so reserved.").
145. Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 421, 426 ("Criti-
cally, the Takings Clause (and parallel state constitutional provisions) requires that any
exercise of the power of eminent domain be attended by the payment of just compensation
to the person whose property is taken. An exercise of the police power, in contrast, is un-
derstood not to require any payment of compensation.").
146. See, e.g., Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877) C'If the public safety or
the public morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture or traffic [of alcohol], the
hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance, by any in-
cidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer. All rights are held
subject to the police power of the State.").
147, See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 478 (2002).
148. See, e.g., State ex rel. Townsend v. Bd. of Park Comm'rs, 110 N.W. 1121, 1122
(Minn. 1907); see also City of Shawnee v. Thompson, 275 P.2d 323, 324 (Okla. 1954) (hold-
ing that a "city cannot give away its rights in the public streets.").
149. Odd Fellows' Cemetary Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 73 P. 987, 988 (Cal.
1903) ("Whenever a thing or act is of such a nature that it may become a nuisance, or may
be injurious to the public health, if not suppressed or regulated, the legislative body may,
in the exercise of its police powers, make and enforce ordinances to regulate or prohibit
such act or thing, although it may never have been offensive or injurious in the past.").
150. See, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 665 (1878).
151. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) ("This power, which, in its
various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of
the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the
people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.").
152. See, e.g., Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 499-503 (1894) (uphold-
ing earlier grant of tax exemption against later legislative impairment); see also Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880) ("While taxation is in general necessary for the sup-
port of government, it is not part of the government itself. Government was not organized
for the purposes of taxation, but taxation may be necessary for the purposes of govern-
ment .... [flor a consideration [Government] may, in the exercise of a reasonable discre-
tion, and for the public good, surrender a part of its powers in this particular."); Home of
the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430, 436-38 (1869) (holding that an earlier grant
of tax exemption to charitable organization could not be superseded by later legislation);
Ely, supra note 56, at 383 ("Despite the growth of the police power exception, courts in the
late nineteenth century ... continued to uphold grants of tax immunity under the Con-
tract Clause.").
153. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) ("If a state could reduce
its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what is regarded as an
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B. The Decline of the Contract Clause in the Twentieth Century
The Contract Clause fell into abeyance in the twentieth centu-
ry.14 Oliver Wendell Holmes had clarified that parties could not
immunize themselves from sovereign power by simply contracting
around it.115 The legal realists in turn had effectively desanctified
and "publicized" contract."' 5 Scholars scrutinized the pervasive,
state-sanctioned entrenchment of private power.157 All of this in
the era when, as Robert Lee Hale noted, the Contract Clause be-
gan to be folded into general Due Process analysis.5 ' A series of
cases during and after the Great Depression yielded a jurispru-
dence of deference. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell is
the most important of these. 59 The legislation at issue in Blaisdell
was Minnesota's Mortgage Moratorium law, passed in the midst
of the Great Depression to provide emergency relief to homeown-
important public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.").
154. Ely, supra note 56, at 376; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private
Contracts, and the Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
597, 598 (1986) (observing the "demise" of the Contract Clause and noting that it had been
enforced only twice in the post-New Deal court); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 890 (1987) (noting that the Contract Clause was now "a dead letter"
due in large part to expansive twentieth-century understandings of the police power).
155. Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908) ("One whose
rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the
power of the State by making a contract about them.").
156. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 603, 604-06 (1943) (attacking liberty of contract and arguing that private contracts
always presupposed public enforcement by the state); see also Clare Dalton, An Essay in
the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1030 (1985) (discussing the le-
gal realists' deconstruction of classic contract doctrine).
157. See generally Louis L. Jaffee, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV.
201 (1937).
158. Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARV. L. REV.
852, 890 (1944) ("It can be said, however, that there is at least a tendency for the contract
clause and the due process clause to coalesce. Although there is no clause expressly for-
bidding the federal government to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, any
federal law impairing them in a manner which the Supreme Court deemed unreasonable
would doubtless be held to be a deprivation of property without due process, contrary to
the Fifth Amendment."); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
241 (1978) ("Although it was perhaps the strongest single constitutional check on state
legislation during our early years as a Nation, the Contract Clause receded into compara-
tive desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly with the
development of the large body of jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause of that
Amendment in modern constitutional history.").
159. 290 U.S. 398 (1934); see David A. Pepper, Against Legalism: Rebutting an Anach-
ronistic Account of 1937, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 145 (1998) ("In the regulatory and Con-
tracts Clause realm, Blaisdell came to signify judicial deference to legislative power to in-
terfere with contracts ...."); see also Ely, supra note 56, at 388 (finding that Blaisdell
delivered a "near-fatal punch" to the Contract Clause).
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ers no longer able to pay their mortgages. 6 ' Citing the cases dis-
cussed above, and against a strenuous dissent, the Blaisdell
Court held that creditors could not use the Contract Clause to
block the mortgage moratorium legislation."6 ' Although clearly
the legislation was passed to remedy an emergent crisis, the
Court's holding was not so limited."2 The Court noted that "the
prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with lit-
eral exactness like a mathematical formula .... Undoubtedly,
whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the
fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power.'
163
After Blaisdell, the Court fashioned a jurisprudence of defer-
ence to general economic regulations, clarifying that police pow-
ers could trump contract even in the absence of emergency condi-
tions."' Consider as an example Veix v. Sixth Ward Building &
Loan Ass'n in which plaintiffs had purchased shares in the Loan
Association Network, a building-and-loan association."' At the
time the shares were purchased, the relevant statutes created a
framework for withdrawing shares. 6 In the early and mid-1930s,
however, the legislation was amended, altering the procedure for
withdrawing shares."' The plaintiff objected to these amend-
ments under Contract Clause and Due Process theories.66 This
argument failed under Blaisdell and general police power princi-
160. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416.
161. See id. at 435-40.
162. Id. at 426 ("While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power."); see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power
& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983) (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey 431 U.S.
1, 22 n. 19 (1976)) ("[S]ince Blaisdell, the Court has indicated that the public purpose need
not be addressed to an emergency or temporary situation.").
163. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 428, 439.
164. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding minimum
wage law under Due Process Clause as a valid exercise of the police power); see also Bibb
v. Navaho Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) ('The various exercises by the States of
their police power stand, however, on an equal footing. All are entitled to the same pre-
sumption of validity when challenged under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Rebecca M. Kahan, Comment, Constitutional Stretch, Snap-Back, & Sag:
Why Blaisdell Was a Harsher Blow to Liberty Than Korematsu, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279,
1305 (2005) (emphasis added) ('The Court further developed Blaisdell in a manner which
emphasized and increased the power granted to governments but without limitation to
emergency situations.').
165. 310 U.S. 32, 34 (1940).
166. Id. at 34-35.
167. Id. at 35.
168. Id. at 36.
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ples.'6 9 The Court gave a nod to Blaisdell's "crisis response" ra-
tionale, but there is little cause to think the case would have
come out differently without that fiction. 70 If there were any lin-
gering doubts that the police power exception did not depend on
any emergency rationale, broad and expansive language in East
New York Savings Bank v. Hahn a few years later should have
put those to rest.17
C. The Contemporary Approach
Justice Marshall's Contract Clause had essentially become a
dead letter during the New Deal period.'72 Contract Clause cases,
like economic legislation more generally, were largely being ana-
lyzed under a deferential rationality review.7 The last major
Contract Clause case before the late 1970s was City of El Paso v.
Simmons in which the Supreme Court was called upon to decide
the validity of a Texas state statute governing land forfeiture.
174
The 1910 statute authorized the State Land Board to sell public
lands and to collect interest from the purchaser."5 In the event of
a missed interest payment, the land would escheat to the state
unless the owner could make the payment before the land was
sold to a third party."' A 1941 amendment provided that the re-
sale of the land would be permissive instead of mandatory and al-
169. Id. at 38-39.
170. See id. at 38-40.
171. 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945) (citations omitted) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)) ('The Blaisdell case and decisions rendered since yield
this governing constitutional principle: when a widely diffused public interest has become
enmeshed in a network of multitudinous private arrangements, the authority of the State
'to safeguard the vital interests of its people' is not to be gainsaid by abstracting one such
arrangement from its public context and treating it as though it were an isolated private
contract constitutionally immune from impairment."); see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19-22 n.19 (1977) (clarifying that there is no emergency require-
ment for a valid exercise of police power against contract interests); W. B. Worthen Co. v.
Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1934) (noting that police power principle applies both to
emergency and routine exercises of sovereign power).
172. See Merrill, supra note 154, at 598 ("Today, the contract clause is but a pale shad-
ow of its former self. With two exceptions, the Supreme Court has rejected every contract
clause contention that has come before it in the post-New Deal era. Although the Court
has never formally equated contract clause analysis with the 'rationality review' it applies
to economic legislation under the due process and equal protection clauses, the tone of re-
cent contract clause decisions approaches this same degree of extreme deference.").
173. See id. at 598-99.
174. 379 U.S. 497, 501 (1965).
175. Id. at 498.
176. Id. at 498-99.
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lowed a period of five years to reinstate missed interest pay-
ments. 7 Payments on a piece of land fell into arrears in the
1940s.""8 Plaintiff obtained the land through quitclaim deed and
filed an application for reinstatement. 179 The applications were
denied because they were not made within the five-year window
allowed under the 1941 amendment.8 0 Plaintiff lost in the district
court because the claim was late under the 1941 statute. 181
The Fifth Circuit reversed and found that the right to reinstate
outside the five-year window had vested, and as a result, the Con-
tract Clause prevented the government from retroactively depriv-
ing plaintiff of that vested right.'8 2 The Supreme Court then re-
versed the Fifth Circuit under the reasoning of the Blaisdell cases
and held that the 1941 amendment was a reasonable exercise of
Texas's police powers 8 3 because it was needed "to restore confi-
dence in the stability and integrity of land titles and to enable the
State to protect and administer its property in a businesslike
manner"'1 4 and to quiet the "spate of litigation" that had accom-
panied the "imbroglio over land titles" created by the earlier stat-
ute.' 5 Moreover, the right to reinstate payment could not reason-
ably be considered as a material inducement to enter the original
land contracts.188 Hence, abridging that statutory right was not
abridging a contract right at all.'87
1. A Contract Clause Revival?
This was the state of the law through the late 1970s. In two
cases in the late 1970s, however, the Supreme Court upheld Con-
tract Clause challenges for the first time in fifty years and articu-
lated the modern framework for Contract Clause analysis. In the
first of these cases, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, plain-
tiffs were bondholders in the New York and New Jersey Port Au-
177. Id. at 499.
178. Id. at 500.
179. Id. at 500-01.
180. Id. at 501.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 509-14.
184. Id. at 511-12.
185. Id. at 513.
186. Id. at 514.
187. Id. at 514-15.
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thority.'5 The 1962 bond agreement at issue had limited the Port
Authority's power "to subsidize rail passenger transportation
from revenues and reserves." ' 9 New York and New Jersey passed
parallel statutes that voided the covenant in the 1962 agreement,
and the bondholders sued.9 The courts below ruled that the 1974
repeal was a valid and reasonable exercise of police power." ' The
Supreme Court reversed,192 and in so doing provided the most ex-
tensive judicial discussion of the contract-sovereignty problem in
many years. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion reiterates the
basic story recounted above: the Contract Clause does not protect
agreements in which the government has alienated some key as-
pect of its sovereignty. 93 But whether the police power is in-
fringed depends on the nature of the contract term at issue. 94
Since the earliest cases, courts have invoked two distinct princi-
ples to justify the police power exception. On the one hand, as
Fletcher teaches: "one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a
succeeding legislature."'99 This is an anti-entrenchment princi-
ple.196 On the other hand, Stone v. Mississippi and later cases tell
us that "the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a
State."'97 This is the void ab initio logic discussed above.9
Although conceding that the distinction was formalistic, the
Court noted that financial functions or taxing functions had tra-
ditionally been removed from the ambit of the police power excep-
tion. 9 The Port Authority bond deal qualified as a financial con-
tract of the sort that had been exempted from police powers since
the nineteenth century.0 This does not mean that the govern-
188. 431 U.S. 1, 3 & n.3 (1977).
189. Id. at 3.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 3-4.
192. Id. at 32.
193. See id. at 21-24.
194. See id. at 23-24.
195. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 135 (1810).
196. See Serkin, supra note 38, at 881-83.
197. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880).
198. See supra Section III; see also Serkin, supra note 38, at 924-25 ("[C]ourts striking
down Contracts Clause challenges to government regulations interfering with pre-existing
contracts did so on grounds that the original government did not have the power to enter
into the contract in the first place.").
199. See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 24-25.
200. See Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1877) ("The truth is, States and cities,
when they borrow money and contract to repay it with interest, are not acting as sover-
eignties. They come down to the level of ordinary individuals. Their contracts have the
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ment is always bound by prior financial obligations." 1 Rather, the
subsequent impairment survives Contract Clause scrutiny if "it is
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public pur-
pose.""2 2 This appears merely to be a restatement of the deferen-
tial reasonableness standard that had been the norm since the
New Deal. Logically, however, financial contracts of the legisla-
ture present a special case cautioning against applying the same
deferential standard.0 3 After all, if we allow the legislature to beg
off paying its debts just by shouting "police power," the Contract
Clause would provide scant protections indeed."4 But where do
we draw the line?
An earlier Supreme Court case, W. B. Worthen Co. v. Ka-
vanaugh, asked whether the government had "totally destroyed"
the contract interest at issue.20 5 The lower court in United States
Trust Co. relied on this notion to uphold the bond legislation be-
cause it had not totally destroyed the value of the bonds.2 0 6 But
according to the Supreme Court, the lower court had misread
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Worthen v. Kavanaugh, which did
not hold that anything less than a total destruction of the value of
the contract made it permissible.2 7 The line separating permissi-
ble from impermissible abridgement of the state's debt obligations
could be marked at some point below total destruction of the val-
ue of the contract.2 8 If the government wanted out of its earlier
financial commitments to Port Authority bondholders, it would
need to demonstrate that the impairment was "reasonable and
necessary" to achieve a public purpose." The Supreme Court also
clarified that there is a bifurcated Contract Clause analysis: one
for private and the other for public contracts.210 Where there are
same meaning as that of similar contracts between private persons .... A promise to pay,
with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an absurdity.").
201. See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 25-26.
204. See id. at 26.
205. 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935),
206. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26.
207. See id. at 26-27.
208. Id. at 27.
209, Id. at 29.
210. See id. at 22-24.
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private contracts, there is rational basis deference. 211 Where there
are public contracts, courts apply heightened scrutiny.2 2
Heightened scrutiny asks three questions: (1) whether a con-
tractual relationship exists; (2) whether the change in the law
impairs the contractual relationship; and (3) whether the im-
pairment is substantial.2 ' Usually, the first two steps are treated
as given, and the Court moves directly to the third.14 If the im-
pairment is considered "substantial," the Court then examines
the nature of the public policy underlying the challenged legisla-
tion.2 1 ' And even if the public interest at play is substantial, the
legislation must still be narrowly tailored to lessen unnecessary
burdens on private interests.1 Here, there was no question that
subsidizing rail transportation-as the states had covenanted not
to do in 1962-was a legitimate public policy.2" The problem was
in the narrow tailoring prong. After all, the states could have cho-
sen "a less drastic modification" than reneging on the promise not
to dip into Port Authority reserve funds to subsidize public
211. Id.at22-23.
212. See id. at 29 n.27; see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 876
(1996) (citing Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413
(1983)) (noting that there is heightened scrutiny under United States Trust Co. when
states violate their own contracts); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 505 (1987) (noting that there is lower scrutiny when states impair private con-
tracts); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 192 n.13 (1983) (noting that a government
contract implicates "special concerns"); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.
244, 234 n.16 (1978) (stating that government impairments of its own obligations "face
more stringent examination under the Contract Clause than would laws regulating con-
tractual relationships between private parties"); Buffalo Teachers Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d
362, 369 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 23, 26)
("When a law impairs a private contract, substantial deference is accorded to the legisla-
ture's 'judgment[s] as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.' Public
contracts are examined through a more discerning lens. When the state itself is a party to
a contract, 'complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity
is not appropriate because the [sItate's self-interest is at stake."). Michael W. McConnell
has called heightened scrutiny for government contracts "precisely backwards." Contract
Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties
and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 293-94 (1988).
213. See Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244.
214. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
215. See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 411-12 (citation omitted) ("If the state regu-
lation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in justification, must have a signif-
icant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a
broad and general social or economic problem.").
216. See Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 248-49.
217. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28 ("Mass transportation, energy conservation, and
environmental protection are goals that are important and of legitimate public concern.").
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transport.1 The states, for example, could have found the money
to subsidize rail transport elsewhere."' Also, it was not as if the
need to subsidize public railways was a new or unforeseeable de-
velopment in 1962.220
The companion "revival" case was Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus.22' The statute at issue was Minnesota's 1974 Private
Pension Benefits Protection Act, which imposed broader pension
obligations on employers than had existed under earlier law.222
The Court found that the legislative damage to the earlier con-
tract was "severe," because the 1974 pension law retroactively
"nullifie[d] express terms of the company's contractual obligations
and impose[d] a completely unexpected liability in potentially
disabling amounts. 223 Unlike the legislation upheld in Blaisdell,
the Minnesota law imposed a "sudden, totally unanticipated, and
substantial retroactive obligation" on private employers and was
not passed in the shadow of "emergency economic conditions" as
in Blaisdell.24 The Court also held, on fairly anemic reasoning,
that because the legislature was prompted to pass the law in re-
sponse to a single large auto plant closure, it was not the same
kind of "broad, generalized economic or social problem" that had
licensed the police power exception in Blaisdell.
2215
218. Id. at 29-30.
219. Id. at 30.
220. Id. at 31-32.
221. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
222. It is important to note that this case involves a contract between private parties
which means that there is no void ab initio problem as there is when a legislature at-
tempts to bargain away its police power in a contract between itself and a private contrac-
tor. The Contract Clause, of course, also limits retroactive impairment of private contracts
See id. at 244 (stating that Contract Clause limits exercises of police powers that "effecto
substantial modifications of private contracts").
223. Id. at 246-47.
224. Id. at 249.
225. Id. at 247-48, 250. It is difficult to see how a legislature responding to deindustri-
alization via pension legislation is not responding to a large social problem. See id. at 263
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Act is an attempt to remedy a serious social problem: the
utter frustration of an employee's expectations that can occur when he is terminated be.
cause his employer closes down his place of work.").
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2. Life after United States Trust Co. and Spannaus
Despite the hopes of some scholars,226 the law did not revert to
the Marshall Court's understanding of the Contract Clause. In-
stead, legislation that impairs private-private contracts will be
reviewed under the deferential rational basis standard.227 Courts
will ask whether the impairment is a reasonable means to a legit-
imate public purpose.2 8 Where, on the other hand, the govern-
ment is a counterparty, there is a more searching inquiry. 229 At
this point, courts will engage in a three-part analysis: whether
there is a contract, whether the change in law impairs the con-
tract, and whether the impairment is substantial. If the im-
pairment is not substantial, the inquiry ends because only sub-
226. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Juris-
prudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 334-35 (1995) (citing Spannaus and
United States Trust Co. as signs of "renewed interest in economic rights" and the Contract
Clause that the Supreme Court "cursorily rejected" soon thereafter); see also Richard A.
Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 703-04
(1984) (citing Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 240-51) ('The occasional Supreme Court decision
hints at renewed judicial enforcement of limitations on the legislative regulation of eco-
nomic activities, but these traces fade as quickly and quietly as they appear."); Douglas W.
Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding,
14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 544-45 (1987) (praising Spannaus and United States Trust
Co. for reviving the Contract Clause, but lamenting that the revival "falls far short of re-
storing it to the power is should enjoy, given the original intention of the Framers"); Bar-
ton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment "Doctrine" and Its Lessons
for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1992) (noting a small uptick in lower
court enforcement of the Contract Clause but also pointing out that the Supreme Court
had not invalidated legislation under the Contract Clause since United States Trust Co.
and Spannaus). It should be noted that states' constitutions usually contain their own con-
tract clauses. Brian A. Schar, Note, Contract Clause Law under State Constitutions: A
Model for Heightened Scrutiny, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 123, 125 (1997).
227. See, e.g., Ass'n of Surrogates & Sup. Ct. Reporters Within N.Y. v. New York, 940
F.2d 766, 771 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1977)) ("Generally, legislation which impairs the obligations of private contracts is tested
under the contract clause by reference to a rational-basis test; that is, whether the legisla-
tion is a 'reasonable' means to a 'legitimate public purpose.").
228. Id. (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 22-23).
229. Id. at 771.
230. RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)); see also Energy Reserves Grp.,
Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (quoting Spannaus, 438 U.S. at
244). The three-part test has also been stated this way "(1) is the contractual impairment
substantial and, if so, (2) does the law serve a legitimate public purpose such as remedying
a general social or economic problem and, if such purpose is demonstrated, (3) are the
means chosen to accomplish this purpose reasonable and necessary." Buffalo Teachers
Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 459 U.S.
at 411-13; Sanitation & Recycling Indus. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir.
1997)).
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stantial impairments are entitled to Contract Clause protection.231
To determine substantiality, the court will examine "the extent to
which the [parties'] reasonable contract expectations have been
disrupted;"2 2 whether "the industry the complaining party has
entered has been regulated in the past;, 233 and whether the future
regulation was foreseeable when the contract was made.234 If the
impairment is deemed "substantial," it can only survive if it is
"reasonable and necessary to serve an important public pur-
pose. ' '21 Where the impairment is substantial, the legislation
must protect a '%road societal interest rather than a narrow
class. 22 6 The state bears the burden of demonstrating a legitimate
public purpose, "such as the remedying of a broad and general so-
cial or economic problem ... rather than providing a benefit to
special interests."2 7
Recent case law has developed the principles laid down in
United States Trust Co. and Spannaus.2 6 As it has always been,
Contract Clause analysis today is highly fact specific. 9  The im-
231. See Spannaus, 438 U.S.at 245; see also Romein, 503 U.S. at 186.
232. In re Workers' Comp. Refund, 46 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Spannaus,
438 U.S. at 244-45).
233. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 411 (citing Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 242).
234. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1977) (upholding Con-
tract Clause analysis in part because the need for mass transit was well known at the
time the states entered the Port Authority bond agreements).
235. Id. at 25.
236. Spannaus, 438 U.S at 248-49.
237. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 412; see also White Motor Corp. v. Malone,
599 F.2d 283, 287 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting that the burden is on the state to justify the im-
pairment and bears a heavier burden of justification where the impairment is substantial).
238. For recent discussions of the Contract Clause, see Evan C. Zoldan, The Permanent
Seat of Government: An Unintended Consequence of Heightened Scrutiny under the Con-
tract Clause, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 163 (2011) (arguing that under the Con-
tract Clause the 1846 retrocession of Alexandria to Virginia that led to a one-third de-
crease in the land area of the District of Columbia was invalid under the original grant);
Comment, The Constitutionality of the New York Municipal Wage Freeze and Debt Morato-
rium: Resurrection of the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 167, 188-91 (1976); E. Glenn
Thames, Jr., Comment, The New Texas Anti-Deficiency Statutes: Do They Impair Con-
tracts?, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 373, 384 (1992) (discussing the Contract Clause challenge to
Texas anti-deficiency statutes), and see also Alex McBride, Comment, The Constitutionali-
ty of and Need for Mortgage Moratoria in the Context of Hurricane Katrina, 81 TUL. L.
REV. 1303, 1307 (2007) (arguing that Hurricane Katrina justified "drastic mortgage mora-
toria' under the Contract Clause); Rachel Moroski, Comment, Desperate Times Don't Al-
ways Call for Desperate Measures: Professional Engineers v. Schwarzenegger Through the
Lens of the Contract Clause, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 183, 186 (2011) (arguing that furloughs im-
posed on state workers in violation of labor statutes violated Contract Clause).
239. See Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector Collective Bargaining
Agreements and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (citing U.S. Trust Co.,
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pairing legislation must "protect a broad social interest.""' Where
the state is targeting vulnerable groups or rewarding favored par-
ties, the court will not find a "public interest."'241 Eliminating
windfall profits, on the other hand, is a legitimate public inter-
est.42 If the possible rescission of the government contract was
foreseeable at the time it was made, courts are less likely to find
an impermissible impairment.2 43 So, for example, where an indus-
try is heavily regulated, it is unreasonable to think that there will
not be future regulatory changes that would impair the value of
contracts. 44 An impairment is not "necessary if there is 'an evi-
dent and more moderate course' of action that would serve De-
fendants' 'purposes equally well.""'2 5 The state bears the burden of
showing that there were not more moderate alternatives. 48 If the
impairment is "limited and temporary," it is more likely to be rea-
sonable.247 Where the state is trying to escape its financial obliga-
431 U.S. at 25) (discussing the fine line between permitting a legislative body to modify a
contract by legislation that serves an important public purpose and prohibiting a legisla-
tive body to impair one of its own contracts to its benefit).
240. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 249.
241. See, e.g., id. at 247-49 (upholding Contract Clause where legislation targeted a
narrow group of employers); see also Energy Reserves Grp,, Inc., 459 U.S. at 417 n.25 (dif-
ferentiating the present case from Spannaus because that case involved "a small num-
ber ... singled out from [a] larger group"); Mascio v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 160
F.3d 310, 314 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1998) (enforcing the Contract Clause where Ohio statute had
a narrow focus and was aimed at specific employers); Bd. of Comm'rs of the Orleans Levee
Dist. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 496 So. 2d 281, 293 (La. 1986) (citing Energy Reserves Grp.,
Inc., 459 U.S. at 412) (stating that the state is not exercising police power where it is
"providing a benefit to special interests").
242. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 412 (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at
31 n.30).
243. See id. at 412 n.14.
244. See id. at 411 (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 31) ("[S]tate regulation that re-
stricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from the contract does not necessarily con-
stitute a substantial impairment."); see also id. (citing Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 242 n.13)
("In determining the extent of the impairment, we are to consider whether the industry
the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.").
245. Univ. of Haw. Profl Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 31); see also Garris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d
1001, 1010 (4th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the statute under the Contract Clause because it
served a "purely private" benefit).
246. See S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1107) (enforcing Contract Clause in part because the government
did not establish that it could not have chosen a path less onerous to plaintiffs contract
interest).
247. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439-40 (1934) (upholding
mortgage moratorium in part because it was 'limited and temporary"); Garris, 630 F.2d at
1008 (rejecting legislation because there was no termination period for existing contracts)
("[There was n]o limited period for unilateral terminations under existing contracts ....
The impact of the legislation was thus immediate, irrevocable, and without limit of time,
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tions, courts will rarely if ever find that the retroactive alteration
248
was necessary.
3. The Winstar Curveball
No overview of the Contract Clause would be complete without
discussing United States u. Winstar Corp.24 Two initial caveats
are in order. First, Winstar is not technically a Contract Clause
case because it deals with the federal government, and the Con-
tract Clause only applies to the states.2 5 ° Second, the Winstar
Court was quite fragmented. Justice Souter wrote a plurality
opinion, which was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, and
partially by Justice O'Connor.2"' Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment and authored a separate opinion, joined by Justice
Kennedy and Justice Thomas.252 Justice Breyer also wrote a sepa-
rate concurring opinion.2 3 Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent
onto which Justice Ginsburg signed with reservations. 24 Never-
theless, Winstar helped to shape judicial understanding of public
contracts and so is worth reviewing here briefly. 5
During the savings-and-loan era of the 1980s, Congress afford-
ed favorable accounting treatment to certain banks in exchange
for their assumption of liabilities. 5 Then, in 1989, Congress en-
acted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
in binding the insurance company in a completely altered, economically disadvantageous
relationship with every agent with whom it had an agency contract on the effective date of
the legislation.").
248. S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 897 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Cayetano, 183 F.3d at
1107 (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29) ("If a state could reduce its financial obliga-
tions whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public
purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.").
249. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
250. Id. at 876 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,
732 n.9 (1984)).
251. See id. at 843; see also Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. United States, 57 Fed. C1.
751, 772 & n.29 (2003) (questioning the precedential effect of Winstar's fragmented opin-
ion).
252. Id. at 919.
253. Id. at 910.
254. Id. at 924.
255. State courts have continued to cite Winstar's analysis of the Contract Clause, de-
spite the fact that Winstar is not a Contract Clause case. See, e.g., State ex rel. Humphrey
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 713 N.W.2d 350, 359-60 (Minn. 2006); Dairyland Greyhound
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408, 494 (Wis. 2006) (citing Winstar's discussion of re-
served powers and unmistakability doctrines).
256. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843.
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ment Act ("FIRREA"), which created stricter capital requirements
than some of the banks could meet."7 The banks sued for breach
of pre-FIRREA agreements that had afforded them favorable ac-
counting treatment.5 The government defended on the grounds
that it could not promise to refrain from exercising sovereign
power in the future unless that promise was rendered in unmis-
takably clear language.2 5 The government also argued that
"FIRREA was a sovereign act that could not trigger contractual
liability. '260 There were four defenses the government could raise
in this situation: (1) surrenders of sovereignty must be unmistak-
able;26' (2) an agent's authority to surrender sovereignty must also
be unmistakable; 262 (3) a government may not surrender reserved
powers; 2" and (4) a government's sovereign acts cannot give rise
264to a breach of contract action.
Justice Souter began by noting the tension between contract
and sovereignty discussed above, and he distinguished the idea of
sovereignty under the American Constitution from that of Par-
liamentary supremacy under the British system."' The ground-
work for the unmistakability defense raised by the government
was laid down in Justice Marshall's Fletcher opinion and the line
of police powers cases discussed in this article.6 The Court syn-
thesized two principles from the early cases. First, there are re-
served or sovereign powers that may not may be bargained
away.' This is the familiar precept from Stone v. Mississippi.2 6 8 A
second line of cases yielded the principle that all public grants
should be strictly construed.2 6 At the beginning of the majority's
historical account, Justice Souter acknowledged that there are
two separate doctrines at issue-"reserved powers" and the canon
257. See id. at 856-58.
258. See id. at 857-58.
259. Id. at 859.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 860 (citing Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477
U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).
262. Id. (citing Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908)),
263. Id. (citing Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880)).
264. Id. (citing Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 460 (1925)).
265. See id. at 872-73.
266. Id. at 873-74.
267. Id. at 874.
268. See id. at 874 n.20 (citing Stone, 101 U.S. 814).
269. Id. at 874 (citing Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830)).
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of construction that all public grants are to be strictly con-
strued. 70 "Reserved powers" refers to the void ab initio idea that
"certain substantive powers of sovereignty [can] not be contracted
away."27' The second notion is that while the federal government
may legitimately make public grants, those grants must be made
in clear and unmistakable terms. 72 By contrast, some powers
cannot be bartered away no matter how clear and unmistakable
the contract language.7 If the government barters away a police
power, then the contract at issue is actually not a contract at
all. 74 But the Court here makes a curious move by lumping these
two lines of cases together, calling them the "early unmistakabil-
ity cases."'75 The requirement of unmistakability "served the dual
purposes of limiting contractual incursions on a State's sovereign
powers and of avoiding difficult constitutional questions about
the extent of state authority to limit the subsequent exercise of
legislative power.""27 What follows is a long discussion that tends
to blur state and federal cases and to downplay the important dis-
tinction between police powers and unmistakability.2"7
In any event, according to the plurality, the Winstar contracts
did not waive a sovereign power by promising not to regulate,
they merely provided that the government would assume the risk
of future regulatory impairments.78 This was well within the
scope of the government's authority.9 There was a practical ra-
270. See id.
271. Id. (citing West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848)).
272. Id. at 874-75.
273. See, e.g., Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach, 86 Cal.
App. 4th 534, 565 n.18 (2001) ("Whether or not a public contract contains language ex-
pressly reserving the government's right to exercise its police powers, the significance of
the reserved powers doctrine is precisely that the government always retains the right to
do so.").
274. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 875.
275. Id. at 874-75.
276. Id. at 875.
277. See id. at 876-81.
278. See id. at 883 ("[Government cannot] simply shift costs of legislation onto its con-
tractual partners who are adversely affected by the change in the law, when the Govern-
ment has assumed the risk of such change."); see also id. at 889 ("The answer to the Gov-
ernment's contention that the State cannot barter away certain elements of its sovereign
power is that a contract to adjust the risk of subsequent legislative change does not strip
the Government of its legislative sovereignty.").
279. See id. at 890 ('There is no question... that the Bank Board and FSLIC had am-
ple statutory authority to ... promise to permit respondents to count supervisory goodwill
and capital credits toward regulatory capital and to pay respondents' damages if that per-
formance became impossible.").
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tionale, too: if the government could raise an unmistakability de-
fense in every routine breach of contract case, the commerce of
government would grind to a halt."' Another problem with the
government's theory was that it depended on drawing a line be-
tween the government-as-contractor and the government-as-
regulator.28' This distinction had never been an easy one to draw,
and here the regulatory and non-regulatory aspects of FIRREA
were "fused.""2 2 So the question was what motivated the legisla-
tion in question.283 Evidence suggested that the motive was to es-
cape the earlier financial commitment Congress had made to the
banks,2 ' which, as we have seen, does not fall into the police pow-
er category.2 Moreover, there was not a sovereignty-contract
problem here because such problems only arise where the gov-
ernment promises not to exercise a sovereign power.88 Here, the
government had merely promised to pay money damages in the
event the government exercised a sovereign power it had prom-
287ised not to exercise.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent highlights the problem with the
plurality's remedies theory,288 which essentially reduces the scope
of the sovereignty exception to situations where plaintiffs ask for
injunctive relief or ask for a damages award that would effective-
ly operate as an injunction.2 9 Aside from the fact that a court
could not properly determine damages until it determined liabil-
280. See id. at 883-85.
281. See id. at 893.
282. Id. at 894.
283. Id. at 900-03 (examining the legislative history to find that Congress expected
FIRREA to release the government from financial obligations); see id. at 898 ('The greater
the Government's self-interest.., the more suspect becomes the claim that its private
contracting partners ought to bear the financial burden of the Government's own improvi-
dence, and where a substantial part of the impact of the Government's action rendering
performance impossible falls on its own contractual obligations, the defense will be una-
vailable.").
284. Id. at 902.
285. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
286. Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485, 491 (Ct. Cl. 1967). ("The Govern-
ment cannot make a binding contract that it will not exercise a sovereign power, but it can
agree in a contract that if it does so, it will pay the other contracting party the amount by
which its costs are increased by the Government's sovereign act.").
287. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 881.
288. Id. at 926 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Joshua Schwartz, Liability for Sov-
ereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 633, 692-93 (1996) (arguing that it is unsound to base sovereignty analysis on
whether parties ask for damages versus injunctive relief).
289. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 926 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ity-the uncertain ground which is the very problem at issue-it
is unclear why plaintiffs would ever risk losing on sovereignty
grounds when they could simply claim that the government as-
sumed the risk of breach and from there proceed to damages.9
Although Justice Rehnquist did not quite put it this way, it
makes little sense to concede that the State cannot barter away
its police power and then, in the next breath, neutralize that
principle by awarding damages to the disappointed contractor in
the event of breach. That may make sense in a true unmistakabil-
ity case at the federal level but makes little sense where the ques-
tion is whether the state has impermissibly bargained away a po-
lice power. Justice Rehnquist makes a similar point about the two
cases the plurality relied on: neither Cherokee Nation nor Bowen
required that the requested damages amount to an injunction be-
fore the Court held that fulfilling the contract would amount to a
waiver of sovereignty. Neither case "hinted that the unmistaka-
bility doctrines applied in their case because the damages remedy
sought 'amount[ed]' to an injunction."92 In other words, limiting a
remedies request to damages could not in itself save a contract
that had improperly bartered away police power. Moreover, this
line of reasoning makes sense only where the government is
treated as another private party. The problem is that the cases
have consistently referred to the dual nature of the sovereign as
contractor and lawgiver.292 As Justice Rehnquist phrases it: "By
minimizing the role of lawgiver and expanding the role as private
contractor, the principal opinion had thus casually, but improper-
ly, reworked the sovereign acts doctrine."2 4
4. Two Aspects of Police Power
It is important to distinguish two aspects of the police power
that are often used interchangeably. In one of the most compre-
hensive historical overviews of the police powers doctrine, Janice
Griffith explains:
290. See id.
291. See id. at 927-28.
292. Id. at 928 (alteration in original).
293. See, e.g., Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. C1. 190, 191 (1865) ("The United States as
a contractor are not responsible for the United States as a lawgiver.").
294. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 931 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The judicial doctrine that prohibits a municipality from bargaining
away its police powers often is used interchangeably with the doc-
trine that bars one legislative body from improperly binding its suc-
cessors. Both doctrines prohibit a municipality from relinquishing
control over those powers or functions that are indispensable to gov-
ernance. The first doctrine highlights the necessity that a local gov-
ernment retain its powers to promote the public health, safety, and
welfare. The second emphasizes the need for each legislative body to
make its own policy as changing conditions dictate. The doctrines
justify a municipality's discretion to derogate from a contract that
bargains away its police powers or prevents it from fulfilling its vitalS 295
functions.
These two aspects are best clarified if we think about two ways
that ordinary contracts can go wrong: one at formation and one at
breach. The legislature is only competent to enter otherwise legal
contracts. Thus, a contract can fail at formation if the subject
matter of the contract is illegal.296 This is the reason that courts
sometimes speak of contracts that are void ab initio when they
purport to bargain away the police powers."' Judith Welch
Wegner has referred to this as the initial incapacity rule. 298 A leg-
islative contract that, for example, sells off the right to cast a leg-
islative vote to a private party is not a contract at all; it is a pseu-
do contract.2 " The legislature simply lacks the power to do this.300
Such an act marks the limits of the police power, rather than be-
ing an example of it. Thus there is no cognizable interest to im-
pair what is, after all, an illegal contract. The second exercise of
public power, and the one courts tend to focus on, is the state's
abrogation of the original contract through subsequent legisla-
tion.30 ' The question in that case is whether the state may impair
295. Griffith, supra note 99, at 282-83.
296. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RIcHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 3:3 (4th ed. 2007) ("As a general rule, both the object for which a contract is
formed and the consideration for which a promise is given must be lawful . . . . A bargain
that is in violation of law, or whose formation or performance aids or assists any party in
violating the law, is typically declared void, and no recovery of any sort may be had on
such a bargain."); see also Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d
706, 712 (Ill. App.. 2004) (citations omitted) ("For instance, if the subject matter of a con-
tract is illegal, that contract is void ab initio. So too are contracts where one of the con-
tracting parties exceeded its authority in entering into the pact.").
297. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880).
298. Wegner, supra, note 71, at 965 n.31.
299. See Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 497 (1897).
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977); Douglas,
168 U.S. at 499-500.
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an otherwise legal contract entered into by an earlier legislature.
Unfortunately, modern Contract Clause courts have confused-or
downplayed3 5-these two distinct kinds of police power analy-
sis."' Winstar typifies this confusion. 4
To see the distinction, consider the following hypothetical. Im-
agine the State of Euphoria signs a contract with Acme, a politi-
cal consulting firm, granting Acme exclusive right to select candi-
dates for public office and to conduct and certify elections in the
State of Euphoria for the next fifty years. Acme diligently meets
its obligations for ten years. The State of Euphoria then enacts a
law called "Take Back Elections," providing that only voters may
choose state representatives and that only employees of the State
of Euphoria may conduct and certify elections. Acme is not
pleased with this and sues the State of Euphoria on the grounds
that the Take Back Elections law violates the Contract Clause.
This is a public contract, so we would apply strict scrutiny and
the three-part test discussed above, which focuses on how sub-
stantial the impairment is."' Here there is no question that this
is a substantial impairment because without the legislation Acme
would still have forty years left on its consulting contract. But
does anyone think that a court should uphold this contract be-
cause it could be construed as meeting the criteria laid out in
United States Trust Co.? The answer to that question has to be
"no" because Euphoria lacked the power to enter the consulting
contract in the first place. Hence, there is no "contract" to enforce
and no grounds for Acme to raise a Contract Clause challenge to
the Take Back Elections law. The Contract Clause is a shield for
private parties to defend against illegitimate impairment of con-
tract expectations.3 6 By the same token, the police powers concept
302. The Court in United States Trust Co. briefly discusses the void ab initio idea but
dismisses it as formalistic and reasons that it wouldn't apply in any event because
"[w]hatever the propriety of a State's binding itself to a future course of conduct in other
contexts, the power to enter into effective financial contracts cannot be questioned." 431
U.S. at 23-24.
303. See Wegner, supra note 71, at 965 n.31 ("It is unfortunately the case that at times
courts and commentators blur analyses by citing cases broadly and by using the phrase
'reserved powers doctrine' to refer both to this rule of initial incapacity and to the principle
that governments may continue to assert their police power prerogatives to justify actions
in contravention of private or public contracts at a later date.").
304. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
305. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
306. See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22.
[Vol. 47:631
LEASING SOVEREIGNTY
is also a sword that legislatures may use to escape illegal bar-
gains entered into by earlier legislatures.0 '
What about an ordinary commercial purchase contract where,
for example, Euphoria agrees to purchase cleaning chemicals for
use in a government office? This contract does not bargain away
the police power because the contract neither delegates policy-
making responsibilities to a private party, nor does the State of
Euphoria promise that it will not exercise its police powers.-
Thus, Euphoria's chemical contract is not void ab initio and does
not offend the principle announced in Stone v. Mississippi."' But
what if the state later impairs this purchase contract by declaring
the cleaning chemical to be hazardous and unsalable? In that
case, there is an important distinction from the consulting con-
tract, which effectively allowed a private party to control the out-
come of a political process. In the consulting contract, there could
be no serious concern that the later legislature might disturb
business expectations precisely because no legitimate expecta-
tions can arise under an illegal contract. Here, however, the situ-
ation is quite different. After all, legislatures have some power to
tie the hands of later legislatures in that later legislatures are not
free to treat an earlier routine purchase contract as void.313
IV. NON-COMPETE CLAUSES REQUIRE STATES TO BARTER AWAY
THEIR POLICE POWERS
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section IV.A
presents excerpts from a fictional concession contract to illustrate
two possible police powers and Contract Clause issues that might
307. See Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885) ("[T]he only right secured [by
the Contract Clause is] to have a judicial determination, declaring the nullity of the at-
tempt to impair [the contract's] obligation."); see also Zigler, supra note 71, at 1462
("[Alnalysis under the contract clause is limited to declaring the statute unconstitutional.
The provision does not authorize the courts to award damages in lieu of requiring the
state to adhere to the original terms of the contract.").
308. This is one reason why ordinary financial contracts are treated differently. See,
e.g., U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 24 ("Whatever the propriety of a State's binding itself to a
future course of conduct in other contexts, the power to enter into effective financial con-
tracts cannot be questioned. Any financial obligation could be regarded in theory as a re-
linquishment of the State's spending power, since money spent to repay debts is not avail-
able for other purposes .... [T]he Court has regularly held that the States are bound by
their debt contracts.").
309. 101 U.S. 814, 817-19(1880).
310. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
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arise under common non-compete terms in recent infrastructure
contracts. The Euphoria Concession Contract below mirrors lan-
guage in the Chicago parking meter concession contract, key sec-
tions of which are included in the Appendix. Section IV.B then
asks whether Euphoria has attempted to barter away its police
power by promising not to build competing infrastructure or
maintaining or upgrading existing infrastructure. I conclude that
there are persuasive objections to certain terms in the Euphoria
Concession Contract on the grounds that Euphoria simply lacked
the power to promise not to build competing infrastructure.
A. Euphoria Concession Contract
The Appendix to this article includes sample language from
some real-world privatization contracts.31' But to make things
simple and focus our inquiry, this section returns to our fictional
State of Euphoria. Like most states, Euphoria is having budget-
ary problems, which have only gotten worse since the financial
meltdown of 2008. Like most states, Euphoria's power to borrow
money is capped under state law.312 Euphoria's physical infra-
structure is decaying. The near collapse of a tunnel linking a
commuter suburb with a downtown business district drew na-
tional media attention to the sad state of Euphoria's public infra-
structure. The tunnel has been repaired, but legislators worry
that under its current taxing regime, the government simply will
not have the resources to maintain the tunnel in the future. In
2008, Acme, a consortium of international investors, approaches
state senators with a proposal that Acme will pay Euphoria $2
billion for the right to collect tolls from the tunnel and stretch of
road that connects the downtown with the suburban bedroom
community (the Acme Road). The contract purports to last seven-
ty-five years and, among many other terms, includes the follow-
ing language:
(1) Euphoria retains its police powers;
(2) Euphoria retains right of entry to the Acme Road at any
time;
311. See infra Appendix.
312. See Roin, supra note 26, at 1975.
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(3) Euphoria will not build any competing public transportation
system within ten miles of the Acme Road;
(4) Euphoria will not repair or upgrade any road or tunnel
within three miles of the Acme Road;
(5) Any exercise of Euphoria's police powers with respect to the
Acme Road or any exercise of Euphoria's right of entry onto the
Acme Road will constitute a Compensation Event;
(6) If Euphoria violates clauses three or four by building, main-
taining, or upgrading competing infrastructure, this will consti-
tute a Compensation Event;
(7) Upon the occurrence of a Compensation Event, Euphoria
will pay Acme damages measured by the loss of toll revenue for
the period of the Compensation Event; and,
(8) Upon the occurrence of a Compensation Event, Acme re-
tains the right to terminate the contract, and Euphoria will pay
Acme a fair market value for the remainder of the contract term.
Legislators worry that some of the contract terms might violate
Euphoria State Constitution article I, section 1, which states:
Section 1: Internal government and police.
The government of the United States is a government of enumerated
powers, and all powers not delegated to it, nor inhibited to the
states, are reserved to the states or to the people thereof. Among the
powers so reserved to the states is the exclusive regulation of their
own internal government and police; and it is the high and solemn
duty of the several departments of government, created by this Con-
stitution, to guard and protect the people of this State from all en-
croachments upon the rights so reserved. 1
Despite these worries, Acme and Euphoria sign the contract in
2008. With the exception of public complaint at the twenty-five
percent increase in tolls, 1 ' this arrangement functions smoothly
for several years. Acme nets $30 million annually from the toll
concession. In the intervening years, media figures and academics
in Euphoria have conducted an extensive public debate over traf-
313. W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
314. Anderson, supra note 1 ("Private investors recoup their money by maximizing rev-
enue-either making the infrastructure better to allow for more cars, for example, or by
raising tolls. (Concession agreements dictate everything from toll increases to the amount
of time dead animals can remain on the road before being cleared.)").
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fic congestion in the downtown corridor. Air pollution and other
environmental concerns also figure prominently in these discus-
sions. In 2012, a slate of reform candidates is elected to the Eu-
phoria legislature on a platform of reforming the transportation
system.
In their first year in office the reformers put forward an ambi-
tious Redevelopment Plan that would create a light-rail commut-
er system connecting the suburbs to the downtown business dis-
trict. One independent study finds that this light rail system
would lead to a fifty percent reduction in automobile traffic from
the suburbs to the downtown corridor. The Redevelopment Plan
is enacted into law, and Euphoria is about to break ground when
Acme sues for an injunction to stop the Plan from moving for-
ward. In addition, Acme sues for damages in lost toll revenues
that will result from the light rail system. How should a court ad-
judicate this challenge?
B. Euphoria's Concession Contract and the Contract Clause
Acme has sued Euphoria to prevent it from going forward with
the Redevelopment Plan or, in the alternative, to seek compensa-
tion under the contract in the event the court denies an injunc-
tion. Acme argues that the Contract Clause prohibits Euphoria
from interfering with its contract expectancy. Moreover, Acme ar-
gues that because this is a public contract, the court should apply
strict scrutiny. However, before a court hears arguments about
"substantiality," it should first determine whether the disputed
contract terms represent an improper attempt to barter away
Euphoria's police powers.315 The Supreme Court has noted that
"[in deciding whether a State's contract was invalid ab initio un-
der the reserved-powers doctrine, earlier decisions relied on dis-
tinctions among the various powers of the State.""31 United States
Trust Co. teaches that the state is free to "contract away" the
power to tax and spend.317 The Court in United States Trust Co.
315. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977); see also Littell
v. City of Peoria, 29 N.E.2d 533, 537-38 (111. 1940); People ex rel. Moshier v. City of
Springfield, 19 N.E.2d 598, 600-02 (Ill. 1939); City of Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E. 784, 787-
89 (Ill. 1925); State Pub. Utils. Comm'n ex rel. Quincy Ry. Co. v. City of Quincy, 125 N.E.
374, 375-78 (Ill. 1919).
316. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 23.
317. See id. at 23-24.
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first decided that the original 1962 bonds were the kind of finan-
cial debt contract that the state was free to enter and thereby
bind future legislatures to pay. 18 Courts will likewise, in almost
every case, enforce municipal bond contracts.319 This is in line
with the historical pattern of exempting taxing and spending
from the police power traceable to the early decisions.
2
Unfortunately, that bright-line rule-a rare bird in this com-
plex area of the law321-will not help us sort out Euphoria's prob-
lematic infrastructure concession deal, which is not analogous to
the financial, bond, or debt contracts at issue in United States
Trust Co. The court will need to delve into the police power cases
for additional guidance. Given the breadth of the police power
concept developed in the case law, a Euphoria court is likely to
find that the state's contract with Acme is void ab initio.
1. General Legislation is an Exercise of Police Power
No clear line has been identified separating permissible public
contracting practices-such as routine financial transactionS122 _
from impermissible attempts to barter away the police power."'
Perhaps none ever can be. Nonetheless, there is no question that
the police powers limitation on government contracting is alive
and well.324 Despite skeptical attacks on the police powers idea as
318. Id. at 24-25.
319. See id. at 27; see also Pierce Cnty. v. State, 148 P.3d 1002, 1010 (Wash. 2006) ("[t
is well-settled that municipal bonds are contractual obligations protected by the contract
clause.").
320. See Ely, supra note 56, at 383.
321. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880) ("Many attempts have been
made in this court and elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire success.
It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general scope
of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself which will be in all re-
spects accurate.").
322. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 24 ('Whatever the propriety of a State's bind-
ing itself to a future course of conduct in other contexts, the power to enter into effective
financial contracts cannot be questioned. Any financial obligation could be regarded in
theory as a relinquishment of the State's spending power, since money spent to repay
debts is not available for other purposes. Similarly, the taxing power may have to be exer-
cised if debts are to be repaid. Notwithstanding these effects, the Court has regularly held
that the States are bound by their debt contracts.").
323. See, e.g., Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 751,
763 (2003) ("In truth, the most unmistakable thing about the 'unmistakability doctrine' is
the sheer number of unresolved questions it engenders.").
324. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 924 N.E.2d 1065,
1089 (Ill. App. 2009) ("Regulatory ratemaking does not implicate the contract clauses of
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a "formalistic" relic of the past,3 25 courts continue to rely on the
police power framing to resolve real-world disputes.326 The cases
state categorically that the Contract Clause does not trump the
police powers of a state.2 As Janice Griffith has ably demon-
strated, however, there is no easy way to distinguish governmen-
tal powers that may not be alienated from routine propriety func-
tions in which the government is acting as an ordinary
contractor.328 The cases reveal a two-stage inquiry: "[T]he first in-
quiry is whether the contract prevents the state from exercising
essential attributes of sovereignty in violation of the reserved
powers doctrine. If the answer is no, courts apply a three-part
test."'329 The threshold question is whether one of the contract
terms is void ab initio.33 ° This involves classifying the governmen-
tal power at issue to decide whether what the government prom-
ised to do (or not to do) falls within the category of "essential at-
tributes of sovereignty."3 1 If the legislature has attempted to
bargain away police powers, there is little sense in asking wheth-
er a later rescission of the earlier improper contract is a "substan-
the state and federal constitutions, and the ability to set rates remains within the police
power of the State .. "); see also Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coal. v. City of Hermosa Beach,
103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447, 469 (Cal. App. 2001) (upholding a law that banned oil drilling in
Hermosa Beach as an "exercise... of traditional police powers"); Mendly v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 831 (Cal. App. 1994) ('The County had no authority to 'con-
tract out' of the then existing law . . .. However, just as the County could not avoid its
then existing statutory obligations, it could not compromise or avoid any future statutory
obligations under different laws. Such a result is tantamount to a contracting away of the
police power of the state."); Anderson v. State, 435 N.W.2d 74, 81 (Minn. App. 1989)
("Even if there had been a contractual obligation to maintain the tax exclusion, the obliga-
tion would have been void ab initio under the Minnesota Constitution article X, § 1, which
prohibits contracting away the state's power to tax.").
325. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 140, at 264-65 ("The reserved powers doctrine is es-
sentially an artifact of legal history.").
326. See infra Section IV (discussing representative modern police powers decisions);
see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitehouse, 868 F. Supp. 425, 432-33 (D.R.I. 1994); Bd. of
Educ. v. Kan. State Bd. of Educ., 966 P.2d 68, 78 (Kan. 1998); South Union Twp. v. Com-
monwealth, 839 A.2d 1179, 1192 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co.
v. State, 639 A.2d 995, 1005 (Vt. 1994).
327. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. at 432-33; Bd. of Educ., 966 P.2d at 78;
South Union Twp., 839 A.2d at 1192; Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 639 A.2d at 1005.
328. See Griffith, supra note 99, at 345.
329. Id.
330. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408, 481 (Wis. 2006) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977)) ("A
threshold question in any contracts clause analysis is whether a contract to which a state
is a party surrenders an essential attribute of state sovereignty. Contracts that limit the
exercise of a state's police power or eminent domain power are 'invalid ab initio under the
reserved-powers doctrine."').
331. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 23.
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tial impairment" because in such a case there is no cognizable in-
terest to impair. If, on the other hand, the legislature has not
bargained away an essential aspect of sovereignty, then the court
should proceed to the three-part test announced in United States
Trust Co.332
The earliest cases established the principle that police powers
are quite broad,"33 and despite the Contract Clause revival, that
principle retains vitality today. 34 Modern state courts understand
most general statutory enactments as exercises of the police pow-
er.3"' For example, in Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of
Hermosa Beach, the city had agreed via contract that a party
could drill for oil on city property, and several years later, Propo-
sition E rescinded the agreement.3 " The court held that Proposi-
tion E's ban on oil drilling was an exercise of traditional police
powers.3 7 Similarly, Optimer International, Inc. v. RP Bellevue,
LLC upheld the Washington state Arbitration Act as a valid exer-
cise of police power against a challenge by a commercial lessor.338
Okfuskee County Rural Water District No. 3 v. City of Okemah
held that an Oklahoma city did not violate the Contract Clause by
raising water rates because public contracts were always subject
332. See, e.g., Wis. Profl Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Lightbourn, 627 N.W.2d 807, 848 (Wis.
2001) (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25) ("If the legislative contract is not invalid ab
initio under the reserved powers doctrine, the question becomes whether the legislature's
impairment of the contract is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public pur-
pose.").
333. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880) (finding that regulating
lotteries within the police power); see also At]. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro,
232 U.S. 548, 558-59 (1914) (stating that police power cannot be bargained away and does
not require compensation when enforced); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (up-
holding reclamation of swamp land as a valid exercise of police powers).
334. See, e.g., Eberth v. Carlson, 971 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Kan. 1999) (quoting Small v.
Kemp, 727 P.2d 904, 910 (Kan. 1986)) ("This court has recognized a city's right to regulate
and restrict the use of public roads through its police power to the extent necessary to
'provide for and promote the safety, peace, health, morals and general welfare of the peo-
ple."'); see also Gordon v. Nash, 9 Alaska 701, 707 (D. Alaska Terr. 1940) ("Subject to con-
stitutional limitations, the state has absolute control of its public streets and highways,
including those of its municipal and quasi-municipal corporations. This power to control
public streets and to provide for proper adjustment of conflicting rights and interests
therein is a police power.").
335. See, e.g., Okfuskee Cnty. Rural Water Dist. No. 3 v. City of Okemah, 257 P.3d
1011, 1017 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011) (citing City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 509
(1965)) ("The United States Supreme Court has held that in the exercise of its police pow-
er, a state is limited only to the extent that it may not pass legislation which repudiates
debts, destroys contracts, or denies the means to enforce contractual rights.").
336. See 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447, 452 (Cal. App. 2001).
337. Id. at 469.
338. 214 P.3d 954, 962 (Wash. App. 2009).
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to later exercises of police power.3"9 Similarly, Sproles v. Binford
upheld Texas statutes imposing size and weight restrictions for
vehicles as a valid exercise of police power against a challenge by
transportation industry interests.340 In these cases, broad, regula-
tory laws are classified as police powers. Contracts in which the
government contracts away regulatory responsibilities, promises
to regulate or to forgo regulation are typically held to be improper
attempts to alienate the police power.34'
The power to control, repair, and maintain the public streets
and roads is another example of the police power. State ex rel.
Townsend u. Board of Park Commissioners of Minneapolis pre-
sents this in clear terms:
It is elementary and fundamental that the power to lay out, open,
widen, extend, vacate, or abandon public highways, public parks,
parkways, or boulevards is legislative, pure and simple, to be exer-
cised by the Legislature itself, or by municipal boards to which it
may be delegated. It is also elementary that a municipality, acting
through its legislative body, has no power to enter into contracts
which curtail or prohibit an exercise of its legislative or administra-
tive authority over streets, highways, or ublic grounds, whenever
the public good demands that it should act.
Townsend is a good example of an important line of cases
couched in terms of a municipality acting ultra vires with respect
to police powers conferred upon the locality by the state govern-
ment. The theory in the municipal cases is that the police power
of the state has been delegated to the city and cannot be contract-
ed away.4 3 Rockingham Square Shopping Center, Inc. v. Town of
339. 257 P.3d at 1017 ("We fimd as a matter of law that the statute is an expression of
the State's police power, it serves a legitimate public purpose, and does not destroy or even
substantially impair the parties' contractual rights.").
340. 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932).
341. See, e.g., City of Parsons v. Perryville Util. Dist., 594 S.W.2d 401, 407 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1979) ("[T]he City had no power to bind itself to a rate for forty-five years which was
not subject to increase to reflect the costs of increased capitalization of the system."); see
also Fid. Land & Trust Co. v. City of W. Univ. Place, 496 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973) ("['A]e do not believe that it was within the contemplation of the Legislature that
the city could bind itself in such a way as to effectively lose control over the operation of its
sewer system ... To uphold this agreement would be tantamount to allowing a private
individual to inhibit the necessary exercise of discretion by the municipality over a gov-
ernmental function. We hold that the agreement is not enforceable.").
342. 110 N.W. 1121, 1122-23 (Minn. 1907).
343. See, e.g., Bildingmeyer v. City of Deer Lodge, 274 P.2d 821, 823 (Mont. 1954) ("A
municipality, in exercising the police power granted to it by the legislature, acts as the
agent of the state ... "') (quoting 37 AM. JUR. Municipal Corporations § 279 (1941)).
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Madison44 is another good example of this. In Rockingham, the
town promised that it would open a road as an inducement to a
private developer to build a shopping center.345 The court held
that the city had acted ultra vires in contracting away statutorily
granted police powers. 46 In the municipal and zoning cases,
courts typically hold that the government can alter zoning regula-
tions even where it had promised it would not, or where doing so
would impair contract obligations.47 Despite being cast in ultra
vires terms, these municipality cases demonstrate that the police
power at issue is the same as that of the state in general.3 8
Cases arise where the state, city, or county promises not to
regulate in a certain way.49 These cases are decided on police
powers theory and often base their holdings on state constitu-
tional or statutory sources that instantiate the police power.
3 50
Courts typically hold that the government has attempted to con-
tract away a police power when it promises to regulate or not
regulate in a certain way in the future."' For example, in County
Mobilehome Positive Action Committee, Inc. v. County of San Die-
go, the county agreed with some landowners to a fifteen-year
moratorium on enacting rent-control legislation.352 This was
struck down as an attempt to barter away the police powers.53
The logic here is clear:
344. 262 S.E.2d 705 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
345. Id. at 707.
346. Id. at 708; see also Levy Court v. City of Dover, 333 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Del. 1975)
("The power... to furnish water and sewer services in the County includes the power and
the duty to decide if and when those services are required in the public interest; it does not
include the power to surrender to others the responsibility for making those decisions.").
347. See, e.g., Richeson v. Helal, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18, 21 (Cal. App. 2007) (city's chang-
ing of zoning rules in contravention of earlier agreement was an exercise of police powers);
Util. Serv. Partners v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 921 N.E.2d 1038, 1047 (Ohio 2009) (public utili-
ty commission acting within police powers when it ruled that public utility would assume
obligations to repair gas lines that had been contracted out to private party).
348. See, e.g., Cotta v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 618 (Cal.
App. 2007) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Often referred to as
the police power, this constitutional authority of counties or cities to adopt local ordinanc-
es is the power of sovereignty or power to govern-the inherent reserved power of the state
to subject individual rights to reasonable regulation for the general welfare. The police
power extends to legislative objectives in furtherance of public peace, safety, morals,
health and welfare.").
349. See, e.g., Cnty. Mobilehome Positive Action Comm., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 73
Cal. Rptr. 2d 409, 411 (Cal. App. 1998).
350. See, e.g., id. at 412-14.
351. See id. at 417.
352. Id. at 413.
353. Id. at 417.
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It is to be presumed that parties contract in contemplation of the in-
herent right of the state to exercise unhampered the police power
that the sovereign always reserves to itself for the protection of
peace, safety, health and morals. Its effect cannot be nullified in ad-
vance by making contracts inconsistent with its enforcement .... 354
Rent control statutes are broad, general regulatory measures that
fall within the scope of police powers, and the state cannot prom-
ise that it will not enact such measures in the future.355 Similarly,
in Alameda County Land Use Ass'n v. City of Hayward, a memo-
randum of understanding between city and county respecting a
13,000 acre tract of land agreed that each party would not take a
certain course of action unless the other party did the same-
essentially agreeing not to regulate in a certain way in the fu-
ture.' 6 This was an improper attempt to give up police powers be-
cause the "policy divest[ed] each respondent, presently and in the
future, of its sole and independent authority to amend its respec-
tive general plan, by providing outside jurisdictions a veto over
such amendments." '357 Likewise, between 2001 and 2003, the City
and County of San Francisco passed a series of resolutions grant-
ing benefits to clean-air taxis, which San Francisco later re-
duced."8 The later reduction was a valid exercise of the police
359power.
2. The Euphoria Contract Promises not to Regulate in the Public
Good
It is worth noting at the outset that Euphoria's state constitu-
tion contains an explicit police power reservation clause.36 ° But
police powers exist whether they are specifically provided for in
the state constitution or not.36 ' The first real challenge is to classi-
fy what exactly Euphoria promised to do or not to do in the Con-
cession Contract. If Euphoria had granted favorable tax treat-
354. Id. at 414 (quoting Delucchi v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43, 48 (Cal.
App. 1986)).
355. See id. at 413, 416.
356. See 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752, 753-54 (Cal. App. 1995).
357. Id. at 757.
358. Cotta v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 614-15 (Cal. App.
2007).
359. Id. at 621.
360. See supra Section IV.A.
361. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 490-91 n.4 (1996) (ex-
plaining that police power is an "inherent" state power).
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ment, Euphoria's later attempt to rescind the agreement would
be barred under general police powers principles.6 Likewise, re-
neging on a financial contract would be impermissible under
United States Trust Co. 3 The litigated terms here, by contrast,
promise that Euphoria will refrain from undertaking certain poli-
cies in the future: in particular, policies of developing, maintain-
ing, or upgrading infrastructure that would compromise Acme's
revenues under the agreement. The cases discussed in Section
IV.B.1 point to a single conclusion: Euphoria's promise not to
build or improve roads is essentially a promise not to exercise
classic police powers. It was a promise that Euphoria did not have
the power to make." Hence, the non-compete clause is void ab in-
itio and, therefore, unenforceable.
3. Police Powers are Not Trumped by Eminent Domain
Before leaving the police power issue and turning to strict scru-
tiny under the Contract Clause, a pair of California cases that
would seem to qualify my argument must be explained. In Profes-
sional Engineers v. Department of Transportation, the California
Department of Transportation ("Caltrans") contracted with a pri-
vate company for the operation of a toll road." ' The contract in-
cluded a clause that read: "Caltrans agree[d] not to issue any
competing franchise or open or operate any competitive transpor-
tation facility within the special zone for the term of the lease or
agreement." '66 In a cursory opinion, the California appeals court,
citing scant authority, held that this provision did not violate the
police power. 67 This was based on the conclusory ground that the
state could later exercise its right of eminent domain if a police
power conflicted with the non-compete provision.6 In essence, the
power to invoke eminent domain should allay any concerns about
alienating the police power.
362. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 875-76 (1996).
363. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977).
364. See Cnty. Mobilehome Positive Action Comm., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 409, 414 (1998).
365. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 601 (Cal. App. 1993).
366. Id. at 602.
367. See id. at 603.
368. See id. ("[W]ere a legitimate, compelling public need to arise for a transportation
facility within a franchise zone that would compete with one of the demonstration projects,
the Legislature, acting to attain this public welfare object, could use its power of eminent
domain to condemn the franchise.").
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The Professional Engineers decision caused some mischief in
the more recent case of City of Corona v. Department of Transpor-
tation, another round of litigation involving Caltrans and private
toll roads."' The City of Corona pled damages flowing from "arti-
ficially elevated traffic congestion on State Highway 91," which
the city attributed to a non-compete clause in the toll concession
contract that prohibited Caltrans from adding "new public lanes
to the highway without the agreement of the private toll road op-
erators.""37 Facing an uphill climb because of the Professional En-
gineers precedent, the City argued inverse condemnation, which
was unavailing.371 The Corona court specifically cited Professional
Engineers' holding that the non-compete was not a police powers
problem because the state still retained the right to eminent do-
main.372
This is plainly not the law and never has been. One salient dif-
ference between eminent domain and police powers is that the
exercise of the latter does not generally give rise to a compensa-
tion claim.373 This principle is not absolute, of course. The gov-
ernment cannot escape a compensation claim merely by invoking
police powers.374 In an era of regulatory takings, however, police
powers and eminent domain can be located on a continuum.37 The
369. See No. E032176, 2003 WL 22332968, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2003).
370. Id.
371. Id. at *11-13.
372. Id. at *11.
373. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, 546-47 (1904); see also Machipongo Land &
Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 676 A.2d 199, 202 (Pa. 1996); Appeal of White, 134 A. 409, 411
(Pa. 1926) ("Under eminent domain, compensation is given for property taken, injured, or
destroyed, while under the police power no payment is made for a diminution in use, even
though it amounts to an actual taking or destruction of property."); Merrill, supra note
145, at 424; Thomas, supra note 121, at 544 (alteration in original) ("By constitutional law,
a governmental entity may taken private property if the taking is for a public use and is
accompanied by just compensation. By comparison, modern jurisprudence authorizes po-
lice power land use regulations that preserve or protect the public health, safety, morals,
or welfare; imposing those regulations does not presume a requirement of compensation.").
374. See, e.g., Williamson Cnty. Reg] Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1984).
375. See David B. Fawcett, Comment, Eminent Domain, the Police Power and the Fifth
Amendment: Defining the Domain of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 503
(1986); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 425 (1982) ('The Court of Appeals determined that [the act] ... is within the
State's police power. We have no reason to question that determination. It is a separate
question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights
that compensation must be paid."); John J. Costonis, 'Fair" Compensation and the Ac-
commodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75
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Professional Engineers court attempts to avoid this issue by simp-
ly reasoning in a circle. After all, eminent domain is only availa-
ble where there is property to be taken.376 The contractor does not
own the road, so this is not a classic eminent domain issue." ' Ra-
ther, the "property" that would be taken in an infrastructure leas-
ing case would be the contractor's interest in the lease. 7 ' But
what is the contractor's interest in a lease that the legislature did
not have the power to make? Invoking eminent domain to over-
come a police powers objection simply assumes that the earlier
grant created a vested property interest. Of course, whether a
valid contract interest accrues in the first place is the very point
at issue. Thus, invoking the availability of eminent domain as a
trump to police powers is begging the question.
The Professional Engineer's reasoning creates a serious prob-
lem within the framework of existing legal doctrine. In every case
finding an improper bartering away of the police power, the court
could simply have ordered damages to the disappointed party un-
der an eminent domain theory. In Stone v. Mississippi the prom-
ise not to regulate the lottery was void, and hence not compensa-
ble, under the police powers theory, 79 but the court could just as
well have required compensation under an eminent domain theo-
ry. But Stone v. Mississippi did not require compensation precise-
ly because the Court held that the legislature lacked the initial
capacity to promise not to exercise its police powers in the fu-
ture.30 It was no rebuttal to say that the earlier promise became
valid because it could later be violated and compensation paid.
But this is how Stone v. Mississippi would have come out under
the Professional Engineers logic: the Stone Court could simply
have reasoned that the initial contract granting the lottery fran-
chise was valid because the state could always exercise its power
of eminent domain later. Such a ruling would eviscerate police
powers as traditionally understood.
COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1033-34 (1975).
376. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
377. See Profl Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't v. Dep't of Transp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 601 (Cal.
App. 1993).
378. See Christopher Serkin, Condemning the Decisions of the Past: Eminent Domain
and Democratic Accountability, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1175, 1181 (2011) ("In addition to
the power to take real property, eminent domain applies to vested development rights,
contract rights, and also more esoteric future interests in property.").
379. See 101 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1880).
380. See id.
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4. Contract Clause Strict Scrutiny
It is likely that a Euphorian court, following the well-
established precedent outlined above, would find the govern-
ment's promise not to regulate in the future to be void ab initio.
Assume for the sake of argument, however, that the court does
not classify the non-compete clauses as invalid attempts to barter
away the police power. Where, as here, the government is trying
to get out of its own contract obligation, a court would apply the
strict scrutiny approach and ask whether the Redevelopment
Plan was a substantial impairment of the Acme Concession Con-
tract.81 It is hard to argue that the Redevelopment Plan would
not substantially impair the value of the Acme Concession Con-
tract. Were Euphoria to go ahead with the project under its police
powers, it would deprive Acme of fifty percent of the promised
revenue because toll traffic would be siphoned off to the compet-
ing transport system. 82 Under United States Trust Co. and
Spannaus, the Redevelopment Plan would probably qualify as
"substantial. '8 3
The second phase of the analysis asks whether the impairing
legislation furthers "a significant and legitimate public purpose
such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic
problem. 384 Most of the factors in the Euphoria hypothetical
would suggest that "yes" is a likely answer to this question. For
one thing, the infrastructure contracts are not the routine finan-
cial contracts that courts rarely allow states to escape.3 ' For an-
other, the Redevelopment Plan is aimed at relieving traffic con-
gestion and encouraging the use of public transportation. These
aims look like classic expressions of public-regarding legislation
as outlined in the discussion of police power cases.388 But this is
still a closer question than the police power inquiry. The Supreme
381. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
382. See supra Section III.
383. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978) (finding im-
pairment substantial where a Minnesota law retroactively altered company's pre-existing
obligations under pension plan); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 28
(1977) (finding impairment of the bonds substantial because it did not benefit the share-
holders).
384. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12
(1983) (citations omitted).
385. Id. at 412, n.14; see supra Section IV.C.
386. See supra Section IV.B.1-2.
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Court rejected similar rationales for New York and New Jersey to
back out their bond contracts in United States Trust Co. 317 Also, in
the hypothetical, the legislation would seem to be aimed at one
particular company, Acme. Where legislation seems to be target-
ed in this way, courts remain alert to possible special interest leg-
islation that is presumptively not in the broad public interest.38
V. CONCLUSION
This article's goal has been to suggest lines of research and in-
quiry into the legal aspects of infrastructure privatization. It has
been a thought experiment intended to shed light on a serious
emerging policy issue whose implications have yet to be fully ap-
preciated. The privatization of public infrastructure in the United
States seems like a long-term trend. Critics are right to worry
about the potential for abuse and the serious political and social
costs of infrastructure privatization."9 Given the negative publici-
ty surrounding the non-competes and the terms of the privatiza-
tion deals more generally, it is not surprising that several states
already forbid non-compete clauses in their enabling statutes. 90
Recent academic work in this area has much to recommend it, but
there is much work to be done. The policy discourse in this area
tends to have a curiously ahistorical quality to it, as if we were
encountering the infrastructure privatization issue for the first
time. It is thus quite important-even critical-to continue to de-
velop and refine our historical and legal framework for privatiza-
tion policy. As the discussion here has shown, American courts
have been grappling with the proper legal architecture for public-
private partnerships since the earliest days. Scholars must con-
tinue to highlight and develop this context to ensure that con-
temporary policy debates are grounded in legal and historical
norms.
387. See U.S. Trust Co. ofN.Y., 431 U.S. at 28.
388. See id.
389. See supra Section I.
390. See Pagano supra note 2, at 383 ("After its sour experience with SR-91, California
amended its legislation to ban noncompetition clauses. The federal government also bans
noncompetition clauses in leases affecting the Interstate Highway System. Texas, in its
2007 amendments, also banned noncompetition clauses.").
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APPENDIX: SELECTED INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
A. Chicago Parking Meter System Concession Agreement391
Section 1.1. Definitions.
"Reserved Powers" means the exercise by the City of those
police and regulatory powers with respect to Metered Parking
Spaces, including Concession Metered Parking Spaces and Re-
serve Metered Parking Spaces, and the regulation of traffic,
traffic control and the use of the public way including the ex-
clusive and reserved rights of the City to (i) designate the
number and location of Metered Parking Spaces and to add and
remove Metered Parking Spaces; (ii) establish and revise from
time to time the schedule of Metered Parking Fees for the use
of Metered Parking Spaces; (iii) establish and revise from time
to time the Periods of Operation and Periods of Stay of Metered
Parking Spaces; (iv) establish a schedule of fines for parking
violations; (v) administer a system for the adjudication and en-
forcement of parking violations and the collection of parking
violation fines and (vi) establish and administer peak period
pricing, congestion pricing or other similar plans.392
Section 3.12. Competing Off-Street Parking.
(a) Subject to Section 3.12(b) and Section 3.12(c), the City
will not operate, and will not permit the operation of, a "Com-
peting Public Parking Facility." A "Competing Public Parking
Facility" means any off-street public parking lot or public park-
ing garage that (i) is (A) owned or operated by the City or (B)
operated by any Person and located on land owned by the City,
or leased to the City, (ii) is within one mile of a Concession Me-
tered Parking Space, (iii) is used primarily for general public
parking; (iv) has a schedule of fees for parking motor vehicles
that is less than three times the highest Metered Parking Fees
then in effect for Concession Metered Parking Spaces in the
same area; and (v) was not used for general public parking on
the effective date of this Agreement ....
391. CHICAGO PARKING METER CONCESSION CONTRACT, supra note 17.
392. Id. § 1.1, at 23.
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(c) If the City undertakes or permits a Competing Public
Parking Facility in violation of Section 3.12(a), such action
shall constitute a Compensation Event requiring the payment
of Concession Compensation. Such action shall not constitute a
City Default, an Adverse Action or a Reserved Powers Adverse
Action. No interest in real estate is conveyed by Section 3.12.3
93
Section 3.19. Administration of the Public Way.
The City agrees, and the Concessionaire acknowledges and
accepts, that the City holds and administers the public way in
trust under the public trust doctrine for the non-discriminatory
benefit of all Persons and interests, including the Concession-
aire and the Concessionaire Interest. In the administration of
its public trust with respect to the public way, the City will not
take any action in contradiction of the public trust doctrine
that is intended to discriminate against the Concessionaire or
the Concessionaire Interest. The foregoing provisions of this
Section 3.19 are not a limitation of any provision of Article 7 or
Section 14.3 .
Section 7.1. Metered Parking Fees.
The exercise by the City of its Reserved Power to establish
Metered Parking Fees shall not be used to favor the use by the
general public of any Other Metered Parking Space located
within one mile of any Concession Metered Parking Space or
any Reserve Metered Parking Space over the use by the gen-
eral public of any Concession Metered Parking Space."'S
Section 7.6. Parking Fines and Enforcement.
(a) General Provisions. The Parties acknowledge and agree
that effective enforcement of parking rules and regulations by
the City and the adjudication and punishment of Persons that
violate such rules and regulations are material to the Parties
and to the administration of this Agreement.... The City cov-
393. Id. § 3.12, at 47-48.
394. Id. § 3.19, at 50-51.
395. Id. § 7.1, at 55.
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enants that it will enforce parking rules and regulations, as in
effect from time to time, in accordance with the provisions of
this Section 7.6 and acknowledges that its failure to do so may
result in losses to the Concessionaire and thereby may consti-
tute a Compensation Event....
(c) Compensation Events. Each of the following shall consti-
tute a Compensation Event: (i) if the City requires more than
three final determinations of parking violation liability for a
passenger vehicle to become eligible for vehicle immobilization,
provided, however, that nothing in this clause (i) limits the City
from enacting dollar thresholds for vehicle immobilization eli-
gibility as long as the average fine and penalty value is less
than or equal to the average value of three final determinations
of parking violation liability, and (ii) if the City offers Persons
with unpaid parking fines or penalties the option of paying an
amount as full satisfaction of the fine and penalty if that
amount is less than ten times the then weighted average hour-
ly Metered Parking Fee for Concession Metered Parking Spac-
396
es.
Section 14.1. Adverse Action.
(a) An "Adverse Action" shall occur if the City, the County of
Cook or the State of Illinois (or any subdivision or agency of
any of the foregoing) takes any action or actions at any time
during the Term (including enacting any Law) and the effect of
such action or actions, individually or in the aggregate, is rea-
sonably expected (i) to be principally borne by the Concession-
aire or other operators of on-street metered parking systems
and (ii) to have a material adverse effect on the fair market
value of the Concessionaire Interest (whether as a result of de-
creased revenues, increased expenses or both), except where
such action is in response to any act or omission on the part of
the Concessionaire that is illegal (other than an act or omission
rendered illegal by virtue of the Adverse Action) or such action
is otherwise permitted under this Agreement; provided, howev-
er, that none of the following shall be an Adverse Action: (A)
any action taken by the City pursuant to its Reserved Powers,
(B) other than as a result of any action taken by the City pur-
396. Id. § 7.6, at 60-62.
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suant to its Reserved Powers, the development, redevelopment,
construction, maintenance, modification or change in the oper-
ation of any existing or new parking facility or mode of parking
or of transportation (including a road, street or highway)
whether or not it results in the reduction of Metered Parking
Revenues or in the number of vehicles using the Metered Park-
ing System, (C) the imposition of a Tax of general application
or an increase in Taxes of general application, including park-
ing Taxes of general application imposed on customers or oper-
ators of parking facilities, or (D) requirements generally appli-
cable to public parking lot licensees including "public garage-
not enclosed" licensees under the Municipal Code.
(b) If an Adverse Action occurs, the Concessionaire shall
have the right to (i) be paid by the City the Concession Com-
pensation with respect thereto (such Concession Compensation,
the "AA-Compensation") or (ii) terminate this Agreement and
be paid by the City the Metered Parking System Concession
Value, in either case by giving notice in the manner described
in Section 14.1().
397
Section 14.3. Reserved Powers Adverse Actions.
(a) Use of Reserved Powers. The Parties acknowledge and
agree that (i) it is anticipated that the City will exercise its Re-
served Powers during the Term, (ii) the impact of certain of
such actions may have a material adverse effect on the fair
market value of the Concessionaire Interest; (iii) the provisions
of Article 7, including the provisions thereof relating to the
payment of Settlement Amounts by the City, are designed to
compensate the Concessionaire for changes resulting from the
exercise by the City of its Reserved Powers in a manner that
will maintain the fair market value of the Concessionaire In-
terest over the Term and (iv) adverse changes may be mitigat-
ed by other Reserved Power actions of the City that will have a
favorable impact on the fair market value of the Concessionaire
Interest. The Parties also acknowledge and agree that there
may be circumstances when the exercise by the City of its Re-
served Powers may have a material adverse effect on the fair
market value of the Concessionaire Interest that cannot be
397. Id. § 14.1, at 93.
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compensated fully under the provisions of Article 7 and that
under such circumstances the Concessionaire may seek com-
pensation with respect thereto (the "Reserved Powers Adverse
Action Compensation").
(b) Reserved Powers Adverse Action. A "Reserved Powers Ad-
verse Action" shall occur if (i) the City takes any action or ac-
tions during the Term that would otherwise have constituted
an Adverse Action under Section 14.1 except that such action
or actions were taken by the City pursuant to its Reserved
Powers, and (ii) such actions, individually or in the aggregate,
are reasonably expected (A) to be home principally by the Con-
cessionaire or other operators of on-street metered parking sys-
tems and (B) to have a material adverse effect on the fair mar-
ket value of the Concessionaire Interest after taking into
account the pro-visions of Article 7. In addition, the events de-
scribed in Section 7.10 relating to a reduction of Concession
Metered Parking Spaces or to the average of the Monthly Sys-
tem in Service Percentage for certain Reporting Years being
less than eighty percent (80%) are each a Reserved Powers Ad-
verse Action.
98
B. South Bay Expressway (SR 125) Agreement 99
Developer has the right to seek compensation for "losses" in
certain events and Caltrans agrees and understands that Devel-
oper is entitled to seek compensation for losses resulting from the
occurrence of any of the following operative events:
(a) The State legislature, the California Transportation
Commission, or any other administrative agency or authority of
the State enacts, adopts, promulgates, modifies, repeals, or
changes any State law, rule, initiative, referendum, constitu-
tional provision, or regulation, all or any of which has the effect
of -
(i) directing Caltrans to acquire the Transportation Facility
or portion thereof,
(ii) terminating, limiting, reducing, or abrogating the rights
or benefits of Developer under this Agreement, or
398. Id. § 14.3, at 95.
399. Dannin, supra note 2, at 105.
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(iii) regulating or interfering with Developer's right to estab-
lish and collect tolls;
(b) The voters of the State, by initiative, referendum, or oth-
er ballot measure, enact, adopt, promulgate, modify, repeal, or
change any State law, rule, initiative, referendum, constitu-
tional provision, or regulation, all or any of which has the effect
of
(i) directing Caltrans to acquire the Transportation Facility
or portion thereof,
(ii) terminating, limiting, reducing, or abrogating the rights
or benefits of Developer under this Agreement, or
(iii) regulating or interfering with Developer's right to estab-
lish and collect tolls; or
(c) Any court issues any order, decree, or judgment which
has the effect of
(i) directing Caltrans to acquire the Transportation Facility
or portion thereof,
(ii) terminating, limiting, reducing, or abrogating, the rights
or benefits of Developer under this Agreement,
(iii) declaring illegal, void, or ultra vires any portion of this
Agreement or voiding the rights of Developer under this
Agreement, or
(iv) regulating or interfering with Developer's right to estab-
lish and collect tolls.
400
400. Id.
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